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 In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the Supreme 
Court held that proof of materiality is required for convictions under 
the federal mail, wire and bank fraud statutes. During the past 20 
years, the federal courts have endeavored to apply the complex com-
mon law concept of materiality to the federal criminal law context. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Universal Health Services, 
Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016), a civil 
case involving the False Claims Act, provided the federal appellate 
courts with an ideal opportunity to reconsider materiality standards 
in federal fraud cases. In particular, criminal fraud defendants 
have argued that Escobar’s “subjective” materiality standard should 
be applied in mail, wire and bank fraud cases involving financial 
institutions. Thus far, these arguments have failed. Instead, the 
Courts of Appeals have endorsed an objective materiality standard 
tethered to what a reasonable bank would do—not the behavior 
of renegade lenders. This Article explores judicial treatment of 
materiality in federal criminal fraud cases, and investigates the 
many challenges that criminal fraud defendants face when they 
try to undermine the government’s proof of materiality by attacking 
the imprudent or reckless actions of banks and other lenders. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College 
(CUNY). JD, NYU School of Law, 1993. 
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INTRODUCTION
 In 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit issued a rather curious decision regarding a mortgage fraud 
scheme engineered by a mortgage loan officer and real estate broker 
named Nicholas Lindsey.1 In a criminal prosecution under the 
federal wire fraud statute, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held “as a 
matter of law, that when a lender requests specific information in 
its loan applications, false responses to those specific requests are 
objectively material for purposes of proving fraud.”2 This holding 
was deeply problematic. The very fact that a lender requests in-
formation cannot simply render that information material as a 
matter of law. Such an approach eviscerates the very notion of 
materiality and, furthermore, deprives the jury of its essential fact 
finder’s role in criminal trials.3
 Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Universal 
Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,4 came to the 
rescue. Although Escobar is a civil case involving the False Claims 
Act, the Supreme Court’s extensive discussion of materiality in 
Escobar provided the Ninth Circuit with a justification for re-
considering Lindsey I.5 Eventually, the panel opinion in Lindsey
I was withdrawn,6 and was replaced by an opinion containing 
more extensive and thoughtful analysis about materiality in federal 
1 United States v. Lindsey (Lindsey I), 827 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g
granted, opinion withdrawn, United States v. Lindsey, 854 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 
2017), on reh’g, United States v. Lindsey (Lindsey II), 850 F.3d 1009 (2017). 
2 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 871. 
3 See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219 (2006) (stating that “ma-
teriality is an element of the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes, 
and thus must be submitted to the jury to support conviction of those crimes” 
(citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999))); Youngjae Lee, Reasonable 
Doubt and Moral Elements, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2015) (“The 
law is axiomatic. In order to convict a defendant, the Constitution requires a 
jury to determine that he is ‘guilty of every element of the crime with which he is 
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 477 (2000) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)))). 
4 Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989 (2016). This Article will refer to this Supreme Court case as Escobar;
some sources use Universal Health Services instead.
5 See infra notes 103–11 and accompanying text (discussing Escobar’s
treatment of materiality). 
6 See United States v. Lindsey, 854 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting pe-
tition for rehearing and withdrawing prior opinion). 
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fraud prosecutions.7 What remained the same in Lindsey II, how-
ever, was the presence of deep judicial skepticism towards defend-
ants who challenge the government’s proof of materiality in mail, 
wire and bank fraud cases by attacking the behavior of lenders.8
Put bluntly, the Ninth Circuit did not want federal fraud trials 
to become a forum for adjudicating the incompetence or malfea-
sance of mortgage lenders who may have helped to trigger the Great 
Recession.9 An observation that survived from Lindsey I to Lindsey 
II is particularly telling: 
We understand the desire to see lenders shoulder responsibility 
for their role in the mortgage crisis of the last decade .... However, 
that does not mean that lenders can be victimized by intentional 
fraudulent conduct with impunity merely because the lenders 
were negligent, or even because the lenders intentionally dis-
regarded the information in a loan application. Two wrongs do 
not make a right, and lenders’ negligence, or even intentional 
disregard, cannot excuse another’s criminal fraud.10
 This Article examines materiality standards in fraud cases 
involving financial institutions and, in particular, considers whether 
Escobar signals a change in the treatment of materiality for crimi-
nal cases brought under the federal mail, wire and bank fraud 
statutes. The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly surveys the 
three primary anti-fraud laws that are used to fight schemes di-
rected at financial institutions: the federal mail, wire and bank 
fraud statutes.11 In particular, Part I examines the meaning of 
the materiality requirement established over 20 years ago by the 
7 Judge Graber replaced Judge Noonan on the Lindsey II panel. See Lindsey 
II, 850 F.3d at 1011 n.*. A separate memorandum opinion vacated Lindsey’s sen-
tence and the amount of restitution ordered for reasons unrelated to the topic of 
this Article. See United States v. Lindsey, 680 F. App’x 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2017). 
8 See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1011–13. 
9 See id. A discussion of the meaning of mortgage fraud and its role in 
causing the Great Recession can be found in Matthew A. Edwards, The Concept 
and Federal Crime of Mortgage Fraud, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57 (2020). 
10 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1014 (footnote omitted). The same language appears
in Lindsey I, 827 F.3d, 865, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit explains it 
used “the words ‘victimized’ and ‘victim’ in this context to describe the original 
lenders, while acknowledging that the entities that actually lost money in this 
scheme at the time of foreclosure—the victims in this case for the purposes of 
restitution—were those financial institutions that purchased the loans and/or 
collateral from the original lenders.” Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1014 n.3. 
11 See infra Part I. 
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Supreme Court in Neder v. United States.12 Part II summarizes key 
aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar with respect to 
materiality under the False Claims Act.13 As we will see, criminal 
defendants have argued that Escobar’s subjective materiality stan-
dard should be applied to wire, mail and bank fraud cases involving 
financial institutions.14 These fraud defendants have argued that 
they should be permitted, under Escobar, to introduce evidence 
about the actual decision-making processes of banks to challenge 
the materiality of their misstatements to financial institutions.15
Part III of the Article uses Lindsey II and another recent federal 
circuit court decision, United States v. Raza,16 to illustrate judicial 
treatment of materiality in federal criminal fraud cases in light 
of Escobar.17 In both cases, the courts rejected the defendants’ ef-
forts to graft Escobar’s subjective materiality standard on to mail, 
wire and bank fraud cases.18 Instead, both circuits endorsed an 
objective conception of materiality, which focuses on how a rea-
sonable lender—not a renegade bank—might respond to a de-
fendant’s misrepresentations.19
 Despite general agreement as to objective materiality 
standards post-Escobar, Part IV of the Article analyzes how the 
federal appellate courts have diverged in terms of their treatment 
of materiality evidence in criminal fraud cases.20 To be specific, 
the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II adopted bright-line prophylactic 
rules against the introduction of materiality evidence of individual 
lender behavior in financial fraud cases, while the Fourth Circuit 
in Raza declined to do so.21 Finally, Part V of the Article dispels any 
lingering confusion over whether objective or subjective materi-
ality standards apply in federal criminal fraud cases involving 
financial institutions.22 The upshot is that the endorsement of 
12 527 U.S. 1, 1 (1999). 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 95–96. 
16 876 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 2017). 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 See infra notes 167–85 and accompanying text (discussing Lindsey II);
infra notes 250–60 and accompanying text (discussing Raza).
19 See infra Section III.E (summarizing the key lessons of Lindsey II and Raza). 
20 See infra Part IV. 
21 See infra Section IV.A. 
22 See infra Part V. 
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objective materiality in the federal appellate courts post-Escobar
does not necessarily mean that the government is precluded from 
establishing materiality with subjective materiality evidence. On 
the other hand, defendants who seek to attack financial institu-
tions for their foolish or imprudent lending practices will find 
that they face hostile legal terrain, which limits the viability of 
such arguments. 
I. FRAUD AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A PRIMER
A. The Wire, Mail and Bank Fraud Statutes 
 Frauds against financial institutions can be prosecuted 
under a variety of federal laws, including, most importantly, the 
federal wire, mail and bank fraud statutes.23 The wire and mail 
fraud statutes,24 with their long histories and extraordinary flex-
ibility,25 are widely touted as “the workhorses of federal white-
collar prosecution.”26 Although they may be beloved by federal 
23 See Steven M. Biskupic, Fine Tuning the Bank Fraud Statute: A Prose-
cutor’s Perspective, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 381 (1999) (stating that the bank fraud 
statute’s “broadness and flexibility have made it the lead charge for prosecutors 
indicting hundreds of white-collar crimes that affect financial institutions 
each year”); Thomas M. DiBiagio, Reaching a Sense of Justice: Understanding 
How the Facilitation Theory of Prosecution Under Federal Criminal Law Can 
Be Used to Hold Hard Targets Accountable for Financial Crimes and Corporate 
Corruption, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 256, 266 (2018) (asserting that “[t]he 
primary federal criminal laws used to address financial crimes and corporate 
misconduct are the federal mail and wire fraud statutes”). 
24 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344 (bank fraud). 
25 The federal mail fraud statute was first enacted in 1872. See Act of June 8, 
1872, ch. 335, § 302, 17 Stat. 323 (1872). The wire fraud statute followed in 
1952. See Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 18(a), 66 Stat. 722 (1952). 
26 Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History 
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 373, 384 (2004). Numerous sources use the exact term “workhorse” to 
describe the mail and wire fraud statutes. See, e.g., Eric Alden, Blocking the 
Ax: Shielding Corporate Counsel from Retaliation As an Alternative to White 
Collar Hypercriminalization, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 95, 108 (2014) (stating that “the 
mail and wire fraud provisions are workhorses of the federal prosecutorial bar”) 
(citing Jack E. Robinson, The Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Correct 
Standards for Determining Jurisdiction and Venue, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
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prosecutors,27 the seemingly boundless application of these two 
statutes has generated scholarly and judicial consternation.28 The 
Seventh Circuit recently warned: “The mail and wire fraud stat-
utes have ‘been invoked to impose criminal penalties upon a 
staggeringly broad swath of behavior,’ creating uncertainty in 
business negotiations and challenges to due process and federal-
ism. We must take care not to stretch the long arms of the fraud 
statutes too far.”29
 The federal bank fraud statute is of relatively recent vin-
tage in comparison to the mail and wire fraud statutes.30 Congress 
enacted the federal bank fraud statute in 1984,31 in response to 
various concerns about the sufficiency of then-existing federal 
anti-fraud laws,32 and to counter Supreme Court case law that 
479, 479 (2008)); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing with the Rules: An Effort to 
Strengthen the Mens Rea Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 685, 694 (2011); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code”: 
Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 63 (2014). 
27 Perhaps the most famous quote on this matter comes from District 
Judge Jed Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.), then a federal prosecutor, who wrote 40 years 
ago: “To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is 
our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our 
true love.” Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L.
REV. 771, 771 (1980). 
28 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41930, MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2019) (“Commentators have argued 
that the statutes ‘have long provided prosecutors with a means by which to 
salvage a modest, but dubious, victory from investigations that essentially 
proved unfruitful.’” (citing John C. Coffee, Jr. & Charles K. Whitehead, The 
Federalization of Fraud: Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes, in WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.05, at 9-73 (1990))). 
29 United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari)). 
30 For the history of the federal bank fraud statute, see Biskupic, supra note 
23, at 382–83; Mehul Madia, The Bank Fraud Act: A Risk of Loss Requirement?,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1445, 1446–49 (2005); 1 JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES:
FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING AND EMBEZZLEMENT § 7:1 (Nov. 2019 Update) 
(providing legislative history of the bank fraud statute). 
31 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1108(a), 98 Stat. 2147 (Oct. 12, 1984) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1344). 
32 See Michael McGregor, Bank Fraud, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR 
& CORPORATE CRIME 73–74 (2005) (Lawrence M. Salinger, ed.) (“The enactment 
of Section 1344 of the law was the product of growing concern over the inability 
of federal prosecutors to reach sophisticated financial criminals with antiquated 
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members of Congress believed impeded prosecutions of frauds in-
volving financial institutions.33 Since 1984, the bank fraud statute 
has been applied to myriad forms of financial malfeasance in-
volving financial institutions, as one article explains: 
Section 1344 is broadly written and criminalizes a variety of 
offenses against financial institutions, including check-kiting, 
check forging, false statements and nondisclosures on loan ap-
plications, stolen checks, the unauthorized use of automated 
teller machines (“ATMs”), credit card fraud, student loan fraud, 
sham transactions between offshore “shell” banks and domestic 
banks, automobile title fraud, diversion of funds by bank em-
ployees, submission of fraudulent credit card receipts, false state-
ments intended to induce cashing checks, and mortgage fraud.34
 During the past three decades, the statutory penalties for 
bank fraud have increased substantially, and Congress has 
statutes, many of which were enacted more than 50 years ago.”); VILLA, supra
note 30, § 7:1 (noting “the long-standing complaint of federal prosecutors that 
they were forced to stretch outmoded statutes to combat sophisticated fraudu-
lent schemes” and stating that “[t]he enactment of the first federal bank fraud 
statute ... was the product of a growing concern over the inability of federal 
prosecutors to reach sophisticated financial crime with antiquated statutes”). 
33 Numerous sources credit Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982), 
as one of the main inspirations for the bank fraud statute. See, e.g., Madia, 
supra note 30, at 1446–47 (explaining that “Congress passed the bank fraud 
statute partly in response to the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Williams,”
in which “the Supreme Court held that persons who engage in fraudulent 
schemes, such as check-kiting, could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, the 
federal provision that criminalized false statements to financial institutions”) 
(footnotes omitted). Another line of Supreme Court cases had limited the reach of 
the federal mail fraud statute to the dismay of some observers. See Loughrin v. 
United States, 573 U.S. 351, 360 (2014) (stating that United States v. Maze,
414 U.S. 395 (1974), was “[o]ne of the decisions prompting enactment of the 
bank fraud law”); VILLA, supra note 30, § 7.1 (explaining that the Maze Court 
had “held that the mail fraud statute must be construed to apply only where 
the mails are used for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, and is not applicable to every case where the mails are utilized at some 
point in the scheme”); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 379 (1983) (“Recent 
Supreme Court decisions have underscored the fact that serious gaps now 
exist in Federal jurisdiction over frauds against banks and other credit insti-
tutions which are organized or operating under Federal law or whose deposits 
are federally insured.”). 
34 Troy Nichols, Financial Institutions Fraud, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 931, 
933–35 (2019) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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amended both the mail and wire fraud statutes to provide for 
increased criminal penalties in wire and mail fraud cases involving 
financial institutions.35 As it stands now, in addition to substan-
tial civil penalties,36 all three anti-fraud statutes carry a maximum 
criminal penalty of $1 million in fines and 30 years imprisonment 
in cases involving financial institutions.37 These three anti-fraud 
laws thus give prosecutors a powerful set of tools to attack fraud 
involving banks and other financial institutions.38
B. Materiality, Reliance and Damages 
 The federal bank fraud statute was modeled on the mail and 
wire fraud statutes,39 and the Supreme Court reads the mail and 
35 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Pub. 
L. No. 101-73, § 961(k) (1989) (increasing maximum penalties under § 1344 
from $10,000 in fines and five years’ imprisonment to $1 million in fines and 
20 years in prison); Id. § 961(i)–(j) (increasing penalties for mail and wire fraud 
offenses that affect a financial institution); 1990 Crime Control Act, Pub. L. 
No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4861, § 2504(h)–(j) (1990) (increasing the maximum period 
of imprisonment for bank fraud violations, as well as cases of mail and wire 
fraud affecting a financial institution, to 30 years). 
36 See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a. In the interests of space, this Article will not spe-
cifically address civil penalties for financial fraud involving financial institutions. 
37 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344. 
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 20 (defining “financial institution”). In addition to federally 
insured banks and credit unions, foreign bank branches, and holding companies, 
mortgage lending businesses were added to the statute after the 2007–2008 
financial crisis as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (“FERA”). 
See Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(a), 123 Stat. 1617 (May 20, 2009); see also United 
States v. Banyan, 933 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2019) (declining to apply the 
bank fraud statute to an alleged fraud scheme involving a mortgage lending 
business that occurred prior to FERA’s amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 20). 
39 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower 
Materiality Standard, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 77, 79 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he 
bank fraud statute ... was modeled on the mail and wire fraud statutes”); Madia, 
supra note 30, at 1458 (discussing background of the bank fraud statute). A House 
Judiciary Committee Report on the proposed Bank Fraud Act acknowledged 
that the text of § 1344 paralleled the language of the mail fraud and wire fraud 
statutes and that the bank fraud statute was intended to incorporate case law 
interpretations of those provisions. See Financial Bribery and Fraud Amendments 
Act of 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-901, 2, 4 (1984). Nevertheless, the Committee 
evidenced mixed feelings about the potential scope of these anti-fraud laws, 
stating that it was “concerned by the history of expansive interpretations of 
that language by the courts,” given that the scope of wire and mail fraud offenses 
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wire fraud statutes in pari materia.40 Thus, these three anti-fraud 
statutes share important legal commonalities, two of which are 
crucial for the discussion here.41 First, in Neder v. United States,
the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
federal bank, wire and mail fraud statutes all require proof of 
materiality.42 The Second Circuit recently explained: “The wire 
and bank fraud statutes do not criminalize every deceitful act, 
however trivial .... to sustain a conviction under these statutes, the 
Government must prove that the defendant in question engaged 
in a deceptive course of conduct by making material misrepresenta-
tions.”43 Second, unlike fraud in tort law,44 the mail, wire and 
bank fraud statutes do not require proof of justifiable reliance or 
damages. In Neder, the Supreme Court stated: “The common-law 
was “clearly greater than that intended by Congress.” Id. Despite this show of 
concern, the House Judiciary Committee explicitly endorsed then-current inter-
pretations of the language, with the final caveat that the Committee “does not 
anticipate any further expansions.” Id.
40 See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005); see also
United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Mail and 
wire fraud are analytically identical save for the method of execution.”) (foot-
notes omitted); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41931, MAIL AND WIRE 
FRAUD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2019) (“The mail 
and wire fraud statutes are essentially the same, except for the medium asso-
ciated with the offense—the mail in the case of mail fraud and wire commu-
nication in the case of wire fraud.”).  
41 In fact, courts often use precedents from one federal fraud statute to in-
terpret another. See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1016, n.4 (2017) (noting that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has used cases on materiality in one context as prece-
dent for materiality in another”); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1520 
(5th Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled that Congress modeled § 1344 on the mail 
and wire fraud statutes, and that the usual practice is to look to precedents 
under those statutes to determine its scope and proper interpretation.”); 
United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302, 1310 n.10 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The 
bank fraud materiality analysis is identical to the materiality analysis required 
for convictions of making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, mail fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.”). 
42 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999). 
43 United States v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019). 
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“One 
who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law 
for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance 
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused 
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”). 
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requirements of ‘justifiable reliance’ and ‘damages,’ ... plainly have 
no place in the federal fraud statutes .... By prohibiting the ‘scheme 
to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud, the elements of re-
liance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes 
Congress enacted.”45 By definition, then, criminal fraud offenses 
are “inchoate” crimes, as Sam Buell explains: “A criminal fraud 
case, of course, requires no proof of reliance or damages: the crime 
of fraud would be inchoate even if there were not also readily 
available attempt and conspiracy doctrines in federal and state 
criminal law.”46
 The Supreme Court steadfastly has adhered to the principle 
that proof of actual harm is not required in federal criminal fraud 
cases involving financial institutions.47 For example, in Shaw v. 
United States, a recent § 1344(1) bank fraud case,48 the Court stated 
45 Neder, 527 U.S. at 24–25. In stark contrast, Neder stated that “the common 
law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality.” Id. at 22. 
46 See Samuel W. Buell, Fraud, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED
ETHICS AND CRIMINAL LAW 265, 267 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly K. Ferzan 
eds. 2019). 
47 Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 467 (2016). 
48 To understand this discussion, a little background on the bank fraud 
statute is helpful. The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, has two separate 
subsections. Section 1344(1) covers frauds squarely aimed at financial insti-
tutions. See Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 357 (2014) (“The first 
clause of § 1344 ... includes the requirement that a defendant intend to ‘defraud 
a financial institution’; indeed, that is § 1344(1)’s whole sum and substance.”). 
Section 1344(2), on the other hand, makes it a crime to fraudulently obtain not 
only a financial institution’s own funds but also those assets under its custody 
or control. For many years, the relationship between the two clauses of § 1344 
was the subject of judicial debate and uncertainty. See United States v. Nkansah, 
699 F.3d 743, 762 (2d Cir. 2012) (Lynch, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment in part) (“Although § 1344 has produced much litigation in the 
Circuits and many separate opinions by learned appellate judges, federal courts 
do not agree on the mental state necessary to support a conviction under § 1344, 
nor on the relationship between the statute’s two subsections.”) (collecting 
cases). Eventually, the Supreme Court weighed in on the relationship between 
the two subsections of § 1344 and explained that the two subsections of § 1344 
“overlap substantially but not completely.” Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 468. Thus, under 
current Supreme Court doctrine, many fraud schemes are amenable to prosecu-
tion under either subsection of § 1344. See VILLA, supra note 30, § 7:7 (explaining 
that “[i]n many instances, a fraudulent scheme will constitute a violation of 
both Subsections (1) and (2)”).  
The Supreme Court specifically declined to read the bank fraud statute to 
eliminate this partial superfluity, noting: “No doubt, the overlap between the two 
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that it had “found no case from this Court interpreting the bank 
fraud statute as requiring that the victim bank ultimately suffer 
financial harm, or that the defendant intend that the victim bank 
suffer such harm.”49 The Shaw Court concluded: “the statute, while 
insisting upon ‘a scheme to defraud,’ demands neither a showing 
of ultimate financial loss nor a showing of intent to cause financial 
loss.”50 Numerous federal circuit court opinions have reiterated 
the principle in criminal fraud cases that “there is no require-
ment that the misrepresentations must have actually influenced 
the decision-maker or that the decision-maker in fact relied on 
the misrepresentations,”51 though some courts have held that a fi-
nancial institution must, at least, be exposed to a risk of loss for a 
scheme to count as fraudulent.52 Accordingly, criminal fraud can 
clauses is substantial on our reading, but that is not uncommon in criminal 
statutes.” Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 358 n.4. The superfluity conceded by the 
Supreme Court is not complete because there may be some fraud schemes that 
can be prosecuted only under § 1344(1), and not § 1344(2). See Loughrin, 573 U.S. 
at 353 (“The Courts of Appeals ... have unanimously agreed that the Govern-
ment can prosecute check kiting (i.e., writing checks against an account with 
insufficient funds in a way designed to keep them from bouncing) only under 
Clause (1), because such schemes do not involve any false representations.”). 
49 Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 467; see also Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 364 (explaining that 
“failure is irrelevant in a bank fraud case, because § 1344 punishes not ‘completed 
frauds,’ but instead fraudulent ‘scheme[s]’” (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 25)). 
50 Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 467. 
51 United States v. O’Brien, 953 F.3d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 2020); see also
United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating that the gov-
ernment “‘need not prove that the decisionmaker actually relied on the false-
hood or that the falsehood led to actual damages’” (quoting United States v. 
Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st Cir. 2013))); Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1014 
(2017) (explaining that the government need not prove actual reliance); United 
States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d 707, 722 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Under the bank fraud 
statute, the Government need not prove that the financial institution actually 
relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations.”). 
52 In a post-Shaw opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated:  
To satisfy the first element of bank fraud under § 1344(1)— “that 
the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a 
scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution”—our case law 
states that the government must show, in addition to materiality, 
that the financial institution was put at “risk,” “potential risk,” 
or suffered a “risk of loss.”  
United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United 
States v. Bowling, 619 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2010)); see also United States 
v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019) (stating that “both wire fraud and 
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still occur even if a bank discovers a borrower’s misrepresentations 
prior to extending credit or ultimately rejects the borrower’s loan 
application.53 In fact, one might conceivably argue that the crime 
of fraud could still occur even if the bank employees misplace and 
fail to review the borrower’s loan application documents alto-
gether.54 What would merely be an unsuccessful attempt at a 
civil fraud is a prosecutable criminal fraud. 
C. Neder’s Materiality Standards 
 With one judicial oddity noted below,55 it seems beyond 
dispute that Neder and its progeny require proof of materiality 
bank fraud require the Government to prove that the defendant had an intent 
to deprive the victim of money or property”); United States v. Bogucki, 316 F. 
Supp. 3d 1177, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“[T]he government need not show that 
the bank actually lost money, but rather only that the bank was exposed to a 
risk of loss.”) (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Stargell, 738 F.3d 
1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013)); United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694 (7th 
Cir. 2003). The extent to which the risk of loss requirement survives Shaw is 
beyond the scope of my discussion here. 
53 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
54 See id.
55 As explained earlier, § 1344 has two separate subsections, see supra note 
48, and most circuit courts that have considered the question have held that the 
materiality element applies to both prongs of 1344. See United States v. Omer, 
395 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ursuant to Neder, materiality of the 
scheme is an essential element of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1). 
As such, materiality must be alleged in the indictment.”); see also United 
States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating, in § 1344(1) 
case, that “[t]he misrepresentation or falsehood must be materially false”); 
United States v. Gordon, 493 F. App’x 617, 629 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Consistent 
with the common law definition of ‘fraud,’ § 1344(1) requires ‘a misrepresen-
tation or concealment of material fact.’” (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 22 (1999))); United States v. Del Campo, 695 F. App’x 453, 455–56 
(11th Cir. 2017) (in case brought under both sections of § 1344, observing that 
“the Supreme Court has held that a conviction for federal bank fraud requires 
that the scheme to defraud employ not simply falsehoods, but material false-
hoods, even though materiality is not expressly mentioned in the bank-fraud 
statute”) (emphasis in original). 
Nevertheless, one outlier must be noted. In United States v. LeBeau, 949 
F.3d 334, 341 (7th Cir. 2020), the defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, 
of multiple counts of bank fraud under § 1344(1). On appeal, LeBeau argued 
that the omission of materiality from the instruction in his trial “impermissi-
bly relieved the government of part of its evidentiary burden and prejudiced 
him.” Id. at 341. Chief Judge Wood, writing for the Seventh Circuit, conceded 
634 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:621 
in federal wire, mail and bank fraud cases and that materiality is a 
question for the jury to consider.56 The question is, of course, what 
does Neder’s materiality requirement entail? The answer to this 
question is not as simple as it first appears. This section will briefly 
review what Neder itself states with respect to materiality, as well 
as several issues that Neder’s treatment of materiality raises. 
1. What Neder Actually Says About Materiality 
 To understand mail, wire and bank fraud materiality, it is 
helpful to start with the text of the Neder opinion itself. The 
that the defendant in LeBeau had raised a serious point, in light of Neder’s 
holding, Seventh Circuit precedent, and the Committee Comments to the 
Seventh Circuit’s Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions. See LeBeau, 949 F.3d at 
341; see also United States v. Freed, 921 F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Pat-
tern instructions are presumed to accurately state the law.”) (citing United States 
v. Marr, 760 F.3d 733, 744 (7th Cir. 2014)). Chief Judge Wood acknowledged, 
however, that there was recent circuit precedent stating that proof of materi-
ality was only required in bank fraud cases brought under § 1344(2), and not 
in cases brought under § 1344(1). See LeBeau, 949 F.3d at 341 (citing United 
States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113, 1119 (7th Cir. 2015)). Without stating directly 
that the prior panel opinion in Ajayi (on which Chief Judge Wood also sat) was 
incorrect, LeBeau provided this guidance: 
The better course, consistent with Neder, is to require the ma-
teriality instruction on all bank-fraud charges, whether brought 
under section 1344(1) or (2). The government has informed us 
that this is its current practice, and we encourage that practice 
to continue until such time as we receive greater clarity from the 
Supreme Court about what is required. 
LeBeau, 949 F.3d at 341. See also United States v. Cross, 962 F.3d 892, 901 
(7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “[t]he government assured the panel in LeBeau
that its current practice is to include the materiality element in all section 
1344 cases,” which is “a prudent policy”). 
Unfortunately for LeBeau, nothing that Chief Judge Wood wrote regarding 
materiality in bank fraud jury instructions was of any help to his appeal. The 
Court of Appeals held that because LeBeau’s lawyer had explicitly consented to 
the instruction without the materiality element, the argument was waived and 
could not be reviewed on appeal even for plain error. LeBeau, 949 F.3d at 341–43. 
56 See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219 (2006) (stating that “ma-
teriality is an element of the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes, 
and thus must be submitted to the jury to support conviction of those crimes”) 
(citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999)); United States v. Rigas, 
490 F.3d 208, 231 n.29 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that “a criminal defendant 
is entitled to have a jury determine his guilt on every element of his alleged 
crime and the jury must pass on the materiality of a defendant’s misrepre-
sentations”) (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1995)). 
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defendant in Neder was convicted of multiple counts of mail, wire 
and bank fraud, and two counts of filing a false income tax return 
(also known as tax fraud).57 The specific offenses are important 
because Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Neder contains 
two different formulations of materiality.58 In the portion of the 
opinion dealing with tax fraud,59 the Neder Court uses the fol-
lowing definition of materiality: “In general, a false statement is 
material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of 
influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was 
addressed.”60 It is of interest and importance that the two cases that 
Neder quotes in the tax fraud materiality part of the opinion, 
United States v. Gaudin,61 and Kungys v. United States,62 both con-
cerned misrepresentations made to United States Government offi-
cials.63 Gaudin involved 18 U.S.C. § 1001,64 an extraordinarily 
broad statutory provision that covers innumerable false state-
ments to federal government officials.65 Specifically, Gaudin was 
prosecuted under § 1001 for making false statements on Federal 
57 Neder, 527 U.S. at 6. 
58 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly 
of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) 
(observing that Neder has two different materiality definitions); United States v. 
Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 616 (4th Cir. 2017) (asserting that Neder “identified differ-
ent standards of materiality for those two categories of fraud”) (citing Neder,
527 U.S. at 16, 22 n.5). 
59 Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (“To obtain a conviction on the tax offense at issue, 
the Government must prove that the defendant filed a tax return ‘which he 
does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.’” (quoting 
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1))). 
60 To make the Neder language easier to process, I have removed any altera-
tions and internal quotes. Readers should know, however, that Neder, 527 U.S. 
at 16, is quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995), which, in turn, 
is quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988). This Article will 
refer to this as the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition. 
61 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
62 485 U.S. 759 (1988). 
63 See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 616–17 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The Neder
materiality standard—emphasizing that the false statement must be capable 
of influencing the decisionmaking body to which it is addressed—is derived from 
earlier decisions assessing materiality issues in fraud schemes that targeted 
the federal government.”) (discussing Kungys, 485 U.S. at 769–70). 
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 
65 For an overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, see Daniel D. Duhaime, False
Statements and False Claims, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 875, 877–92 (2019). 
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Housing Administration and Department of Housing and Urban 
Development loan documents.66 At issue in Kungys was a provision 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act,67 under which the Govern-
ment can bring an action to cancel a certificate of naturalization 
due to its procurement “by concealment of a material fact or by will-
ful misrepresentation.”68 Accordingly, like Gaudin, Kungys also
involved falsehoods aimed at the U.S. government officials—in 
the latter case, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.69
 The section of the Neder opinion dealing with wire, mail and 
bank fraud, however, does not repeat the Gaudin/Kungys mate-
riality formulation,70 but instead quotes the influential materiality 
definition from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.71 The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts provides two alternative definitions 
of materiality: (1) a matter is material if “a reasonable man 
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in de-
termining his choice of action in the transaction in question,”72
or (2) a matter is material if “the maker of the representation 
knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is like-
ly to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of 
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.”73 The 
comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts explain the justi-
fication for permitting subjective materiality, in addition to ob-
jective materiality: 
66 Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 508. 
67 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 763 (stating that the first issue presented in the 
case was “whether certain misrepresentations or concealments made by Kungys in 
connection with his naturalization proceeding were material within the meaning 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952”). 
68 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (setting forth duty of U.S. attorneys to bring ac-
tions “for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such 
person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground 
that such order and certificate of naturalization were ... procured by conceal-
ment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation”). 
69 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772 (holding that “the test of whether Kungys’ con-
cealments or misrepresentations were material is whether they had a natural 
tendency to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service”). 
70 It is entirely possible that the Neder Court felt that repeating the first 
materiality standard was not necessary. 
71 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5. (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (AM. L. INST. 1977)). 
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
73 Id. § 538(2)(b). 
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Even though the matter misrepresented is one to which a rea-
sonable man would not attach any importance in determining 
his course of action in the transaction in hand, it is neverthe-
less material if the maker knows that the recipient, because 
of his own peculiarities, is likely to attach importance to it. 
There are many persons whose judgment, even in important 
transactions, is likely to be determined by considerations that 
the normal man would regard as altogether trivial or even ri-
diculous. One who practices upon another’s known idiosyncracies 
cannot complain if he is held liable when he is successful in what 
he is endeavoring to accomplish.74
 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts accepts either an 
objective standard of materiality, based upon a reasonable person, 
or a subjective standard of materiality based upon what the maker 
knows about the particular recipient of the misrepresentation; 
either suffices. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts similarly 
permits either an objective or a subjective standard of materiality 
in the context of misrepresentations,75 for reasons that mirror those 
provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.76
74 Id. § 538 cmt. f. 
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A 
misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person 
to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce 
the recipient to do so.”); see also id. § 162 cmt. c (“The requirement of materiality 
may be met in either of two ways. First, a misrepresentation is material if it 
would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent. Second, 
it is material if the maker knows that for some special reason it is likely to induce 
the particular recipient to manifest his assent.”). This is not to say that mate-
riality necessarily is required to rescind or disaffirm a contract. That is a sepa-
rate issue. 
76 A comment to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, like the comments 
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, explains the justification for permitting 
subjective materiality, in addition to objective materiality. 
There may be personal considerations that the recipient regards 
as important even though they would not be expected to affect 
others in his situation, and if the maker is aware of this, the 
misrepresentation may be material even though it would not 
be expected to induce a reasonable person to make the proposed 
contract. One who preys upon another’s known idiosyncrasies 
cannot complain if the contract is held voidable when he succeeds 
in what he is endeavoring to accomplish.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981). See also
Stephanie R. Hoffer, Misrepresentation: The Restatement’s Second Mistake,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 129 n.89 (2014) (“The Restatement’s use of the word 
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2. Issues Concerning Neder’s Materiality Standards 
 As we have seen, Neder requires proof of materiality in fraud 
cases brought under the federal, mail, wire and bank fraud stat-
utes.77 According to the Supreme Court: “It is a settled principle 
of interpretation that, absent other indication, ‘Congress intends 
to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it 
uses.”78 But what does materiality really mean? As Emily Sherwin 
aptly observes, “[t]he precise meaning of materiality is somewhat 
elusive.”79 David Kwok, who concludes that materiality is not a 
simple element,80 further contends: “Not only is analysis of ma-
teriality itself complex, but the element of materiality is likely 
related to existing elements of fraud. Evaluating materiality likely 
requires reconsideration of these other factors, and a failure to 
understand the interaction may create vagueness and uncer-
tainty.”81 In short, transplanting a slippery, ever-evolving com-
mon law term, like materiality, to the criminal law context, as 
mandated by Neder, is bound to be a challenging task. 
 The following related questions regarding the meaning of 
materiality recur in this Article.82 First, are the two materiality 
‘preys’ is particularly interesting since the maker of a material misrepresenta-
tion does not have to know with certainty that the statement is false.”) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981)). 
77 See supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text (discussing Neder).
78 Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013). 
79 Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, 
and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2003). 
80 David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?, 53 GA. L.
REV. 495, 528 (2019). 
81 Id. at 532. In particular, proof of mens rea or fraudulent intent is closely 
related to the element of materiality. See id. at 532–37 (discussing the rela-
tionship in fraud between materiality and mens rea, and between materiality 
and harm); United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(noting “the connection between the materiality element and the additional 
requirement that the government prove fraudulent intent”); United States v. 
Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“Because the focus of 
the mail fraud statute, like any criminal statute, is on the violator, the pur-
pose of the element of materiality is to ensure that a defendant actually in-
tended to create a scheme to defraud.”). 
82 Exactly how much of an effect (hypothetical or otherwise) is required to 
satisfy the criminal fraud materiality standard is a question beyond this Article’s 
scope. See United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 234 (2d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing 
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standards discussed in Neder in tension or are they simply differ-
ent ways of expressing the same basic legal principle? Second, do 
Neder’s two materiality standards apply in different types of fraud 
cases?83 (Of course, if the two materiality standards are conso-
nant, then this question would not be of much import). Third, is 
the materiality standard in federal criminal fraud cases objective or 
subjective?84 Or can materiality be either objective or subjective?85
“relevance” from “materiality”). There are innumerable formulations of mate-
riality in judicial opinions, though, as the Second Circuit opines: “All of these 
specifications of the materiality inquiry target the same question: would the 
misrepresentation actually matter in a meaningful way to a rational decision-
maker?” United States v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis 
in original); see also United States v. Tum, 707 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2013) (wire 
fraud requires proof of “false or omitted statements that a reasonable person 
would consider important in deciding what to do”), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1025 
(2013); United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“A 
statement is material if the misinformation or omission would naturally tend 
to lead or is capable of leading a reasonable person to change his conduct.”). 
83 More specifically, it could be asked whether the Gaudin/Kungys mate-
riality definition applies in mail, wire and bank fraud cases even though that 
definition appears in the portion of Neder discussing tax fraud. In Escobar,
Justice Thomas asserts, in passing, that Neder uses the Gaudin/Kungys material-
ity definition “to interpret the mail, bank, and wire fraud statutes.” Escobar,
136 S. Ct. at 2002 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 16). Moreover, since Neder was 
decided, many courts have cited the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition in 
federal mail, wire or bank fraud cases. See, e.g., United States v. Prieto, 812 
F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019); United 
States v. Plany, 711 F. App’x 392, 394 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hames, 
185 F. App’x 318, 325 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 
231 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 
2017); see also Couture, supra note 58, at 7–8 (stating that most courts apply 
the Gaudin definition in mail and wire fraud cases); William K.S. Wang, Applica-
tion of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability For
Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220, 279 n.191 
(2015) (collecting cases using the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition). 
84 See generally Lauren D. Lunsford, Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud 
and the Person of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age, 99 KY. L. J. 379, 387–94 
(2010–2011) (addressing whether an objective or subjective conception of ma-
teriality applies in criminal fraud cases). For a discussion of judicial conflicts 
over objective and subjective fraud materiality standards pre-Neder, see Mark 
Zingale, Note, Fashioning a Victim Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud: Ordinarily 
Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1999). 
85 See infra Section V.A. 
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 The fourth, and final question is whether Neder’s citation 
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s definition of materiality 
truly counts as an endorsement of this definition by the Su-
preme Court for use in the criminal fraud context. Not everyone 
believes that it does.86 In United States v. Svete,87 Judge Tjoflat 
criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion for using mod-
ern sources, such as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to expli-
cate the meaning of materiality under the mail fraud statute.88
In Judge Tjoflat’s view, the Eleventh Circuit ought to have relied 
only upon materiality sources that were contemporaneous with 
enactment of the mail fraud statute in 1872.89 Moreover, Judge 
Tjoflat rejected the idea that Neder commanded such a result, 
arguing that the Supreme Court was not endorsing the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts’s materiality definition in Neder but was 
merely “regurgitating” Neder’s arguments.90
86 See United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1172 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring). 
87 Id. In Svete, the Eleventh Circuit held that the mail fraud statute does not 
require “proof of a scheme calculated to deceive a person of ordinary prudence.” 
Id. at 1166, overruling United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996). 
88 Id. at 1171–72 (“I am troubled by the court’s reliance on contemporary 
sources to define materiality, rather than using the meaning of the word as it 
was understood in 1872, the year of the enactment of the mail fraud statute.”) 
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring). 
89 Id. at 1172–73. Judge Tjoflat specifically recommends JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (10th ed. 1870), because it “was 
written at nearly the same time as the enactment of the mail fraud statute, 
that source provides a better understanding of the settled meaning of materi-
ality under the common law as it existed in 1872.” Id. at 1173; see also id. at 
1170 (“This case is a statutory construction case involving an old statute. In 
defining the acts that the statute declares to be criminal, we must put aside our 
modern perceptions and preoccupations. Our job is to determine what Congress 
intended at the time the statute was made law.”) (Edmondson, C.J., concurring 
in the result). 
90 Judge Tjoflat explains: 
As I read Neder, the Court only cited the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts because Neder, himself, relied on it to support his ar-
gument that materiality is an element of the mail fraud statute. 
Specifically, the Court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 
a footnote appended to the following statement: “Neder contends 
that ‘defraud’ is just such a term, and that Congress implicitly 
incorporated its common-law meaning, including its requirement 
of materiality, into the statutes at issue.” The Court’s citation 
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 Judge Tjoflat, therefore, argues that courts should not use 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts “to define the contours of the 
mail fraud statute’s materiality requirement.”91 Whether or not 
Judge Tjoflat is ultimately correct regarding his reading of Neder,
undoubtedly the Neder Court was more concerned with deter-
mining whether the mail, wire and bank fraud statutes required 
materiality at all, and the justices likely were less focused on 
what the materiality standards ought to entail and whether it 
was ideal to apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the criminal 
context.92 For now it is sufficient to recognize that Neder provides 
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts has limited precedential 
value because it was merely a regurgitation of Neder’s argument. 
Thus, a more straightforward reading of Neder suggests that 
the Court did not cite the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the 
proposition that the meaning of words in a statute enacted in 
1872 can be identified by reference to a modern restatement 
of the law. 
Svete, 556 F.3d at 1172 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (quoting Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999) (footnotes omitted)). See also Lunsford, 
supra note 84, at 387 (“It is entirely possible that this standard was merely 
what Neder was arguing for at the time, rather than the Court’s endorsement 
of the ‘reasonable man’ objective standard.”). 
91 Id. at 1172–73. 
92 A little history is helpful here. Just two years before Neder was decided, 
the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which bars false statements to 
certain specified financial institutions, did not have a materiality require-
ment. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997). Given that the wire, 
mail and bank fraud statutes, like 18 U.S.C. § 1014, make no explicit mention 
of materiality, the big question before the Supreme Court in Neder was 
whether the Court would imply a materiality requirement into these federal fraud 
statutes at all, not what the materiality standard might entail. Ultimately, 
Neder distinguished Wells as follows: 
In contrast to Wells, the three federal criminal statutes at issue 
in Neder explicitly referred to “schemes or artifices to defraud.” 
This textual distinction altered the Court’s analysis. The Neder 
Court explained that “both at the time of the mail fraud stat-
ute’s original enactment in 1872, and later when Congress 
enacted the wire fraud and bank fraud statutes, actionable 
‘fraud’ had a well-settled meaning at common law” that “re-
quired a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.”
In fact, the Court noted, “the common law could not have con-
ceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality.” 
Matthew A. Edwards, Punishing Hope? Materiality and Immateriality in Federal 
Mortgage Fraud Cases under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, 22 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 492,
499 (2020) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 20–21, 22) (footnotes omitted). 
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two materiality standards—the Gaudin/Kungys materiality defini-
tion and the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s materiality defini-
tion—and that the application of these materiality standards to 
criminal fraud cases raises several important questions.93
II. ESCOBAR AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
 In Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Escobar, the Supreme Court considered the validity of “implied 
false certification” claims brought under the False Claims Act 
(FCA).94 Justice Thomas explained the nature of such claims: 
According to this theory, when a defendant submits a claim, it 
impliedly certifies compliance with all conditions of payment. 
But if that claim fails to disclose the defendant’s violation of a 
material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement, so the 
theory goes, the defendant has made a misrepresentation that 
renders the claim “false or fraudulent” under § 3729(a)(1)(A).95
 Escobar ultimately held that implied false certification 
claims could be a basis of False Claims Act liability when “the 
claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific 
representations about the goods or services provided,”96 and “the 
defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statu-
tory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those rep-
resentations misleading half-truths.”97
93 See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 
93–94. 
94 Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1993 (2016); see also Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns that Do Not Shoot to 
Foreign Staplers: Has the Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar
Provided Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the False 
Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2018) (explaining that the False 
Claims Act “permits both private individuals and the federal government 
(through the U.S. district attorneys’ offices) to file an action in court on behalf 
of the United States against a government contractor believed to have know-
ingly submitted false claims to the federal government for payment”). 
95 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995; 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (providing for civil 
liability for one who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the government). 
96 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001. 
97 Id. Since Escobar was decided there has been some debate as to whether 
these two requirements are both absolutely necessary in all implied false certifi-
cation claims or whether the Supreme Court was merely stating that satisfying 
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 At the same time, however, the Court also endorsed what 
it described as a “demanding” and “rigorous” materiality standard 
for implied false certification claims under the FCA.98 A tough 
materiality standard was essential because, in the view of the Su-
preme Court: “The False Claims Act is not ‘an all-purpose antifraud 
statute,’ or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of con-
tract or regulatory violations.”99 Justice Thomas further explained: 
A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because 
the Government designates compliance with a particular statu-
tory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a condition of 
payment. Nor is it sufficient for a finding of materiality that the 
Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew 
of the defendant’s noncompliance. Materiality, in addition, can-
not be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.100
 Justice Thomas declined to specify whether the materiality 
standard that applied to implied false certification claims came 
from the common law or the text of the FCA itself.101 Instead, he 
these two requirements could be one suitable method of proving an implied 
false certification claim under the FCA. See United States ex rel. Rose v. 
Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2018) (observing that the Escobar 
“Court did not state that its two conditions were the only way to establish 
liability under an implied false certification theory,” but nevertheless explaining 
that Ninth Circuit post-Escobar precedent requires proof of both conditions 
until a contrary en banc determination occurs); Farringer, supra note 94, at 
1250–53 (discussing this issue). 
98 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (“The materiality standard is demanding.”); 
id. at 1996, 2002 (“rigorous”); see also Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d at 1024 (Smith, J. 
dissenting in part) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court stated four times that 
the materiality test was ‘rigorous’ or ‘demanding’”), cert. denied sub nom. Stephens 
Inst. v. U.S. ex rel. Rose, 139 S. Ct. 1464 (2019); United States v. Sanford-Brown, 
Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that the FCA’s “materiality 
requirement is ‘rigorous’ and ‘demanding’” (citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03, 
2004 n.6)); United States ex rel. Marsteller v. Tilton, 880 F.3d 1302, 1312 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (“The materiality standard is ‘demanding,’ and ‘rigorous.’” (citing 
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996, 2002)). 
99 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States 
ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)). 
100 Id.
101 Id. at 2002 (“We need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality 
requirement is governed by § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common 
law.”). See also Farringer, supra note 94, at 1255 (contending that “[t]he Escobar 
Court’s decision not to address the relationship between the statutory definition 
of ‘material’ found in Section 3729(b)(4) and the guidance it set forth regarding 
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asserted: “Under any understanding of the concept, materiality 
‘look[s] to the effect on the likely behavior of the recipient of the 
alleged misrepresentation.”102 As such, the Escobar Court ex-
plained that courts adjudicating FCA claims should consider not 
only whether the government had designated compliance with con-
tract terms and applicable regulations as a precondition to pay-
ment, but also how the Government actually had responded to 
noncompliance in the past.103 The Court wrote: 
[P]roof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily limited to, 
evidence that the defendant knows that the Government con-
sistently refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based 
on noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, or 
contractual requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays 
a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain 
requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that 
those requirements are not material. Or, if the Government 
regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual 
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has 
signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the 
requirements are not material.104
 Escobar establishes that, in the FCA context, the Govern-
ment’s actual behavior is crucial to the question of materiality.105
Proving materiality therefore requires that juries be provided with 
a real-world understanding of how the Government typically acts 
in the face of noncompliance with statutory, regulatory, or con-
tractual requirements. Does the Government usually pay or not? 
The Tenth Circuit explains: “[R]ather than directing courts to 
focus exclusively on a reasonable person—as they would under a 
how to assess materiality has caused confusion among the lower courts about 
how to square these two standards”). 
102 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (quoting RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 69:12, at 549 (4th ed. 2003) (emphasis added)). Escobar then 
cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 (1977), and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 162(2) (1981). 
103 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (“In sum, when evaluating materiality under 
the False Claims Act, the Government’s decision to expressly identify a provision 
as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive.”). 
104 Id. at 2003–04. 
105 See Farringer, supra note 94, at 1258 (explaining that “the thrust of the 
Escobar opinion ... is the newly established focus on the government’s behavior 
and the defendant’s knowledge of such behavior”). 
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purely objective analysis—or exclusively on the mindset of the 
misrepresenter—as they would under a purely subjective analysis—
Escobar focuses the materiality inquiry on the likely reaction of 
the recipient.”106
 Although Escobar’s materiality reasoning has been sub-
jected to criticism,107 there is no doubt that the Court’s opinion has 
had a profound impact.108 Not surprisingly, criminal defense attor-
neys have found the doctrinal development in Escobar rather
intriguing and they have argued that Escobar’s treatment of mate-
riality under the False Claims Act should be extended to federal 
criminal fraud cases.109 After all, the argument proceeds, if the 
Government’s actual conduct is relevant to determine materiality 
in the False Claims Act context, then perhaps the actions of 
banks and other lenders is relevant in mail, wire and bank fraud 
cases involving financial institutions.110 As we will see, however, 
such arguments have been thus far unsuccessful in the federal 
106 United States ex rel. Janssen v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 949 F.3d 533, 
541 (10th Cir. 2020). 
107 See Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the 
Quest for Fraud That “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1811, 1833 (2017) (asserting that “[t]he single biggest weakness in the 
Escobar opinion is the failure to clearly define materiality”); see also Latoya 
C. Dawkins, Not So Fast: Proving Implied False Certification Theory Post-
Escobar, 42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 163, 179–80 (2017) (“Escobar should have 
done more to delineate what is needed to show that the misrepresentation 
would have affected the government’s decision to pay.”); Kwok, supra note 80, 
at 538 (arguing that Escobar “adopts an unusual materiality standard that 
conflates criminal and civil law principles” and “imposes a materiality stand-
ard for civil fraud that does not reflect existing civil contract principles, and it 
counterintuitively makes imposition of civil fraud liability more difficult than 
criminal fraud liability”).  
108 See Alexander Kristofcak, FCA v. FDA: The Case Against the Presump-
tion of Immateriality from Agency Inaction, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 246 (2020) 
(“Judging from the sheer number of opinions citing Escobar, the impact of the 
case is undeniable, even if the exact nature of the impact is difficult to pin down.”) 
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 246 n.54 (stating that “[i]n the two and a 
half years since its publication, Escobar has been cited over five hundred times, 
including nearly one hundred times at the court of appeals level”). 
109 See Craig Margolis & Christina Ferma, The False Claims Act: Why Should 
a Civil Statute Matter to Criminal Lawyers?, 31 CRIM. JUST. 26, 28 (Winter 
2017) (noting that “[c]riminal practitioners have already begun to cite Escobar in 
their briefing on materiality”). 
110 See id.
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appellate courts.111 The next section uses two recent, important 
mortgage fraud cases, United States v. Lindsey, and United States 
v. Raza, to explore the criminal fraud implications of Escobar.
III. POST-ESCOBAR CASE STUDIES IN MATERIALITY
A. Lindsey’s Mortgage Fraud Scheme and Trial 
 Nicholas Lindsey, a mortgage loan officer and real estate 
broker,112 perpetrated a classic mortgage fraud scheme using straw 
buyers or straw borrowers for numerous residential properties.113
In order to obtain approval for the straw buyers’ loan applica-
tions, Lindsey made the borrowers appear more creditworthy by 
depositing money into their bank accounts and falsely stating their 
incomes on their loan applications.114 For example, Lindsey re-
cruited Madelon Bridges, flew her to Las Vegas, paid off her debts, 
and gave her $10,000 for her role in his mortgage fraud scheme.115
Lindsey then had Bridges “sign a loan application that falsely 
represented, inter alia, that she intended to live at the property 
she was applying for a loan to purchase, paid $3,300 a month in 
rent, was gainfully employed, and had a sizeable bank account.”116
In the end, Bridges was the named buyer of a Las Vegas house 
worth $720,000, even though she actually lived in Louisiana and 
only had “$50 to her name.”117 For good measure, Lindsey also used 
Bridges’s personal information to take out another mortgage loan 
without her knowledge.118 Bridges was only one of Lindsey’s straw 
111 See infra Section III.A. 
112 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017). 
113 Id. at 1012. In a related appeal, the Ninth Circuit summed up Lindsey’s 
actions as follows: 
Lindsey ran an elaborate mortgage fraud scheme that targeted 
vulnerable and impoverished individuals and convinced them 
to act as straw buyers for properties in Las Vegas. He also stole 
their identities and purchased other properties without their 
knowledge. When the scheme caused foreclosures on the proper-
ties, Lindsey profited while lenders lost money and the straw 
buyers were left with ruined credit.  
United States v. Lindsey, 680 F. App’x 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2017). 
114 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1011. 
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buyers; he “perpetrated similar frauds with five straw buyers—
including his sister—on nine home loans and eight different 
properties.”119 As the Ninth Circuit explained: “The properties 
secured through this scheme were destined for foreclosure, creat-
ing large losses for financial institutions while Lindsey benefit-
ted financially from commissions, rent payments, and diverted 
escrow monies.”120
 The government charged Lindsey with nine counts of wire 
fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft.121 Prior to trial, 
the government moved to prevent Lindsey from introducing evi-
dence of lender negligence at trial.122 The district court reserved 
judgment on the matter,123 but the battle lines were drawn—the 
government was going to do all that it could to prevent Lindsey 
from putting the lenders on trial. As the government expected, 
during the trial, Lindsey’s attorney repeatedly sought to draw 
attention to the lenders’ behavior.124 This became a point of con-
tention between Lindsey’s lawyer, the government, and the trial 
judge. For example, during opening statements, District Judge 
Lloyd “warned Lindsey’s attorney to ‘stay away’ from the issue 
of lender negligence.”125 Lindsey’s lawyer persisted, however, as 
the Ninth Circuit explains: 
Nevertheless, Lindsey’s counsel described 2006 to 2007 as “a 
wild time” of mortgage lending, one that he had once referred 
to as the “Wild West.” It was a period, counsel said, when “there 
were mortgages being offered that had never been offered before 
and perhaps may never be offered again.” These mortgages in-
cluded “stated income” and “no income, no assets” loans. The 
Government objected to defense counsel’s description of the 
loan products, arguing that it was evidence of lender negligence. 
The district court allowed the description of the loans, but warned 
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1011; see also id. at 1012 (noting that “Lindsey profited by receiving 
significant commissions, rent payments, and diverted escrow monies” from one 
of his schemes). 
121 Id. at 1012. 
122 Id.
123 Id. (explaining that “[t]he district court declined to rule on the issue, 
concluding that a final ruling ‘would be more appropriately made in the con-
text of the development of the evidence at trial’”). 
124 Id.
125 Id.
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counsel again to “stay away” from suggesting negligence. The dis-
trict court subsequently told the parties that it was “inclined” 
to exclude evidence of lender negligence from the rest of trial.126
 Of course, an “inclination” is not a final ruling, and the issue 
of lender negligence arose again during cross-examination of gov-
ernment witnesses.127 The court allowed cross-examination tes-
timony about the general state of the mortgage industry, as well as 
stated income and no document loans at the time of Lindsey’s 
alleged fraud.128 The district court, however, sustained the Gov-
ernment’s objection when Lindsey’s attorney asked a lender’s 
employee specifically about “previous bad loans that her employer, a 
lender, had provided.”129 In a similar vein, the court prevented 
Lindsey’s counsel from eliciting testimony from a lender’s former 
employee of how the employee would have responded to particular 
inaccuracies regarding the applicant’s bank accounts in a loan 
application.130 On the other hand, the district judge gave Lindsey’s 
lawyer some latitude during closing arguments, permitting the 
lawyer to make several comments, over the Government’s objec-
tion, about the frenzied state of the mortgage lending market 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession.131
Finally, although the district court instructed the jury that “[l]oose 
126 Id. at 1012–13 (footnote omitted). 
127 Id. at 1013.
128 Id. at 1013, 1018. 
129 Id. at 1013. The district court apparently accepted the prosecutor’s ar-
gument that the “the district court had already ruled on the issue of lender 
negligence, and so defense counsel’s question was irrelevant.” Id.
130 Id.
131 The opinion reads: 
During closing arguments, Lindsey’s counsel again hit on the 
lending standards previously commonplace in the mortgage 
market. He explained that “[i]n 2006 and 2007 America was on a 
mortgage loan high.” As a result of “[e]asy lending practices” and 
“100 percent financing of a mortgage on stated income and 
stated assets,” lenders made bad loans to “people [who] bought 
houses they could not afford.” The Government objected to these 
statements, but the district court overruled the objection. De-
fense counsel also told the jury that buyers and sellers of real 
estate were “extremely busy,” making money very quickly, and 
would sometimes make mistakes or “do things on purpose just 
to close a deal.” 
Id. at 1018. 
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lending practices do not constitute a defense to wire fraud,”132 the 
judge also stated that “the lending standards applied by the fi-
nancial institutions that lent the money in this case are relevant to 
the question of materiality.”133 In the end, the jury convicted Lindsey 
of wire fraud and identity theft, and he was sentenced to 132 months 
in prison and ordered to pay over $2 million in restitution.134
B. Lindsey I’s Per Se Materiality Rule 
 On appeal, Lindsey argued that the district court pre-
vented him from presenting a complete defense in violation of 
his constitutional rights.135 In particular, Lindsey claimed “that 
the district court erred by preventing him from presenting evi-
dence about the ‘stated income/no doc’ loans, thus barring him 
‘from challenging the materiality of false statements on a loan 
type that invites the applicant to state their income without justifi-
cation or support.’”136 The Lindsey I panel began by observing 
that the First Circuit had recently created a “bright-line” approach 
to materiality, which it found persuasive.137 Lindsey I then explicitly 
adopted the First Circuit’s bright-line test,138 and held “as a 
matter of law, that when a lender requests specific information 
in its loan applications, false responses to those specific requests 
are objectively material for purposes of proving fraud.”139 Thus, 
any of Lindsey’s arguments regarding materiality were unavailing 
since, most assuredly, he had provided inaccurate information on 
the many loan applications involved in the case.140
132 Id. at 1013, 1018. 
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1011, 1013. Lindsey was sentenced to 108 months on the wire fraud 
counts and 24 months for identity theft. Id. at 1013. 
135 Id. at 1014; Lindsey I, 827 F.3d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 2016).  
136 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 869. 
137 Id. at 871 (citing United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st Cir. 
2013); United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2016)). 
138 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 871.
139 Id.
140 Id. (“The government introduced evidence that the lenders specifically 
requested information about, inter alia, employment, income, and assets, and 
that Lindsey provided false information with the intent to fraudulently se-
cure loans.”). 
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 Lindsey I’s adoption of the First’s Circuit’s per se material-
ity rule was deeply misguided for a three reasons. First, an argu-
ment can be made that neither Appolon nor Prieto actually created 
a per se materiality rule in the first instance.141 Second, even if 
the First Circuit has adopted a per se materiality rule, the First 
Circuit’s rule is arguably narrower than the materiality rule 
enunciated by Lindsey I.142 Third, putting aside the First Cir-
cuit’s approach altogether, the per se materiality rule stated by 
Lindsey I is without merit.143 This part of the Article will briefly 
discuss each of these three arguments. 
 Undoubtedly, there is broad and incautious language in 
Appolon and Prieto suggesting that materiality can be established 
simply by a borrower providing incorrect information on a loan 
application.144 Nevertheless, a close reading of Appolon and Prieto
calls into question whether those are the First Circuit’s actual 
holdings in those two cases.145 Most important, in both Appolon
141 See infra text accompanying notes 139–50. 
142 See infra text accompanying notes 151–53. 
143 See infra text accompanying notes 154–56. 
144 For example, in Appolon, the court asserted that because the application 
forms for one of the transactions “specifically sought information regarding the 
purchaser’s income, assets, and intent to reside in the property, all of which were 
designed to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness,” United States v. Appolon,
715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st Cir. 2013), this indicated that the “responses were capable 
of influencing its decision.” Id. In addition, in Prieto, the First Circuit asserts that:  
[I]t is ... fair to presume that a loan applicant’s stated income 
level and plans for using the property in question would have 
a “natural tendency” to influence a lender’s decision. Why else, 
after all, did the lender demand the information and Prieto take 
the risk of providing false information? 
United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2016). This rhetorical question is 
particularly unfortunate. That is exactly what a criminal fraud prosecution 
must establish—that the defendant provided false information as part of a 
scheme to defraud someone and that the information is material. One cannot 
elide the question by simply proclaiming that a lie must be legally significant 
because, well, why would one party ask for information and why would some-
one lie in response to the request? 
145 The line between a holding and dicta can be frustrating to discern here. 
In Prieto, the First Circuit describes Appolon as follows: “In that case, the 
government’s evidence that the victim lender had ‘explicitly sought’ infor-
mation from the fraudulent applicant and had received false information in 
return satisfied the government’s burden on that element.” Prieto, 812 F.3d 
at 13 (quoting Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368). Prieto then states: “We ruled that 
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and Prieto there was witness testimony before the jury that went to 
the question of materiality.146 Neither case relied solely on the 
fact that the lenders requested the information as conclusive 
proof that the information provided was material.147 For exam-
ple, in Appolon, although the government had not presented any 
witness testimony regarding the loan evaluation process for one 
of the transactions involved in the fraud scheme,148 the First 
Circuit contended that the jury reasonably could rely on witness 
testimony regarding the lending protocols for another lender in-
volved in the case to consider the materiality of the defendant’s 
misrepresentations—especially given the substantial similari-
ties in the lenders’ applications.149 Thus, in Appolon, there was 
some witness testimony about loan procedures relevant to the 
question of materiality.150
 Similarly, in Prieto, the jury heard lay witness testimony 
from “a mortgage broker with a decade of experience in the in-
dustry and a cooperating witness who had submitted numerous 
loan applications on Prieto’s behalf.”151 Although the defendant 
argued that the witness “did not have insight into the particular 
underwriting practices of the victim institutions during the rele-
vant time period,”152 the First Circuit determined that his testi-
mony was relevant to the question of materiality.153 Regardless 
of whether the materiality evidence ought to have been deemed 
sufficient in either Prieto or Appolon, the important point here is 
that both cases involved witness testimony in addition to the 
proof that the loan documents contained false statements.154
‘[t]he fact that [the lender’s] loan application explicitly sought [certain] information 
from the applicant indicates that [the defendant’s] responses were capable of 
influencing its decision.’” Id. (quoting Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69). At the same 
time, however, Prieto explicitly acknowledges that the evidence in Appolon “was 
helpfully accompanied by testimony from an officer of a different mortgage 
lender about the range of criteria relevant to that lender’s loan processing 
procedures.” Prieto, 812 F.3d at 13 (citing Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69). 
146 See Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69; Prieto, 812 F.3d at 13–14.  
147 See Appolon, 715 F.3d at 369; Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14. 
148 Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368. 
149 Id. at 369. 
150 See id. at 368–69.  
151 Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14.  
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368–69 (1st Cir. 2013); Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14. 
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Neither case relied solely on loan document falsehoods alone to 
establish materiality.155
 Second, to the extent that Appolon and Prieto did create a 
bright-line materiality test, the Lindsey I panel’s holding arguably 
was even broader than in those two cases. In Prieto, the First 
Circuit states that “it is ... fair to presume that a loan applicant’s 
stated income level and plans for using the property in question 
would have a ‘natural tendency’ to influence a lender’s decision.”156
The exact language is important. It is one thing to have a judicially 
created materiality presumption in mortgage loan applications for 
false statements about the borrower’s income and their plans to 
reside in the property—these are undeniably two of the most im-
portant items on any mortgage loan application—but it is quite 
another to hold, as Lindsey I did, that any false responses in a loan 
application with respect to any matter are, as a matter of law, mate-
rial.157 That is a much broader, and more dubious, proposition.158
 This leads to the third and ultimate flaw in Lindsey I’s
materiality holding. Even if Lindsey I had been correct that to 
conclude that the First Circuit has a true bright-line per se ma-
teriality rule, following this rule was inadvisable on the merits. 
The simplicity of such a per se materiality rule is only matched 
by its vacuity. Think about the implications of this reasoning—
that any time a party to a contract, such as a mortgage loan 
agreement, requests information from another party, by defini-
tion, the request alone proves that the information is material, 
independent of any evidence about its potential significance to 
any decision-making processes.159 Such an approach eviscerates 
155 See Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69; Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14. 
156 Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14; see also Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368 (noting that 
the loan file for one of the transactions “included application forms that spe-
cifically sought information regarding the purchaser’s income, assets, and 
intent to reside in the property, all of which were designed to assess the borrower’s 
creditworthiness”). 
157 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 871. 
158 Even a presumption regarding income overstatement might still be in-
advisable, but at least it is relatively narrow. See Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14 (be-
cause “residential mortgage lenders were devoting scant resources to the 
verification of applicants’ income levels, it is nevertheless fair to presume 
that a loan applicant’s stated income level and plans for using the property in 
question would have a ‘natural tendency’ to influence a lender’s decision”).  
159 Conversely, the Second Circuit has held “that contractual disclaimers of 
reliance on prior misrepresentations do not render those misrepresentations 
2021] FRAUD AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 653 
the very nature of materiality. Why have materiality as a separate 
element of a criminal offense, if we presume materiality when 
the falsity of the statement in response to an inquiry has been 
established?160 In order to understand why this is a misguided 
approach, we now will turn to Lindsey II, which discarded the 
bright-line rule from Lindsey I, and even more tellingly, did not 
even cite the First Circuit’s opinions in Prieto and Appolon.161
The excision of these First Circuit precedents in Lindsey II is an 
implicit concession of the flawed reasoning in Lindsey I, and a 
repudiation of the First Circuit’s alleged per se materiality rule. 
C. Lindsey II: Distinguishing Escobar and Adopting Rigid
Evidentiary Rules 
 Escobar, provided the Ninth Circuit with a justification for 
granting rehearing in Lindsey.162 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit once 
again rejected Lindsey’s claim that he had been prevented from 
presenting a complete defense.163 To get to that point, though, the 
Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II was compelled to address Escobar.164
As Judge Gould explained: “According to Lindsey, Escobar directs 
that factfinders in a mortgage fraud prosecution be free to consider 
any evidence of lender behavior, including how an individual lender 
treats a particular false statement on its loan applications.”165
immaterial under the criminal mail and wire fraud statutes.” United States v. 
Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Ghilarducci, 
480 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument that contracts should 
have put fraud victims on notice that oral representations would not be hon-
ored and thus were “immaterial or without tendency to influence”). 
160 See United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 231 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The simple 
fact that the Co-Borrowing Agreements required information does not make any 
misstatement of that information per se material.”) (citing United States v. 
Rodriguez, 140 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
161 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2017).  
162 See Shin v. United States, No. CR 04-00150 SOM, 2017 WL 2802866, at 
*1 (D. Haw. June 28, 2017) (explaining that Escobar led to the Ninth Circuit’s 
rehearing of Lindsey I), aff’d, 782 F. App’x 595 (9th Cir. 2019)). 
163 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1019. In fact, the Ninth Circuit suggested that 
the district court had been too generous, by allowing Lindsey to introduce evidence 
that would not be admissible according to the Lindsey court’s reasoning. Id.
at 1018–19.  
164 Id. at 1016–17. 
165 Id. at 1017. 
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Put another way, Lindsey argued that Escobar requires trial 
courts to allow criminal fraud defendants to introduce proof about 
the subjective decision-making processes of those who are the 
recipients of a falsehood in a fraud scheme—such as banks and 
other financial institutions.166
 Lindsey II rejected this reading of Escobar.167 As opposed 
to Lindsey I, with its ill-advised adoption of a per se materiality 
rule borrowed from the First Circuit, Judge Gould thoughtfully 
and carefully worked to explicate and reconcile several principles 
and precedents regarding federal fraud law.168 Most important 
for its analysis, the Court of Appeals contended that materiality 
under the wire fraud statute is evaluated under an objective
test.169 As the court explained: “This standard is not concerned 
with a statement’s subjective effect on the victim, but only the 
‘the intrinsic capabilities of the false statement itself.’”170 The 
idea of objective materiality undergirds the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis in Lindsey II. Connected to this point, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that so-called “lender negligence in verifying loan appli-
cation information, or even intentional disregard of the infor-
mation, is not a defense to fraud.”171 After all, the thinking goes, 
if we care only about the intrinsic capabilities of a false statement 
and its actual effects (successful or otherwise), then the actions 
of the lender, whether negligent or otherwise, should have no 
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1017–18. 
168 Lindsey II begins with the two basic principles that are beyond dispute: 
materiality is an element of the wire fraud offense, id. at 1013, but proof of 
reliance or actual damages is not required. Id. at 1014–15. 
169 Id. at 1014 (“The element of materiality is evaluated under an objective 
test, in which we must examine ‘the intrinsic capabilities of the false state-
ment itself, rather than the possibility of the actual attainment of its end.’” 
(quoting United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008))); see 
also id. at 1015 (“A false statement is material if it objectively had a tendency 
to influence, or was capable of influencing, a lender to approve a loan.”). 
170 Id. at 1015 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072 
(9th Cir. 2008)). 
171 Id. at 1011–12 (“[W]e hold that lender negligence in verifying loan ap-
plication information, or even intentional disregard of the information, is not 
a defense to fraud, and so evidence of such negligence or intentional disre-
gard by particular lenders is inadmissible as a defense against charges of 
mortgage fraud.”). 
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bearing on the question of materiality.172 As Judge Easterbrook 
explained in an earlier mail fraud case, “Once the Supreme 
Court excludes reliance as a separate element of the mail-fraud 
offense, it will not do for appellate judges to roll reliance into 
materiality; that would add through the back door an element 
barred from the front.”173 To do so would threaten the very na-
ture of criminal fraud as an inchoate offense.174
 Judge Gould was unconvinced that Escobar disturbed this 
basic understanding of federal criminal fraud law.175 He distin-
guished Escobar by drawing a distinction between the context of 
the False Claims Act, which protects the United States Govern-
ment, and federal anti-fraud laws, which cover an entire mar-
ketplace of lenders: 
[Lindsey’s] interpretation misses that the Federal Government 
in an FCA case is in a far different position than is an indi-
vidual lender in a mortgage fraud prosecution. A single lender 
represents only some small part of the market for issuing 
mortgages. The Federal Government, by contrast, represents 
the entire market for issuing federal government contracts. 
The weight the Government gives to a particular statutory, 
regulatory, or contractual requirement is analogous not to the 
weight an individual lender gives to a statement on its loan 
application, but rather the weight the entire mortgage indus-
try gives to that type of statement. 
This difference matters because materiality measures natural 
capacity to influence, not whether the statement actually in-
fluenced any decision .... The way the entire market has his-
torically treated a statement or requirement says a lot about 
that statement or requirement’s natural capacity to influence 
a decision by market participants. But the way one market 
participant of many has previously treated a statement says 
little or nothing about that statement’s inherent ability to af-
fect decision making.176
172 See United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(“A perpetrator of fraud is no less guilty of fraud because his victim is also 
guilty of negligence.”). 
173 United States v. Rosby, 454 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006). 
174 See Buell, supra note 46 (explaining the inchoate nature of fraud as a 
criminal offense). 
175 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017. 
176 Id. (citation omitted). 
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 Lindsey II thus theorizes that subjective and objective 
materiality standards essentially merge in the Escobar context 
of the False Claims Act—how the Federal Government hypotheti-
cally would respond to explicit or implicit misrepresentations is 
basically the same as how the Government routinely does respond 
to such misstatements.177 The same cannot be said for fraud against 
financial institutions where, according to the Ninth Circuit, “the 
way one market participant of many has previously treated a 
statement says little or nothing about that statement’s inherent 
ability to affect decision making.”178
 Ultimately, based upon its objective understanding of ma-
teriality and its reading of Escobar, the Court of Appeals in 
Lindsey II determined that “the district court did not deny Lindsey 
the opportunity to present a complete defense.”179 If anything, 
Ninth Circuit opined that the district court had been a bit too 
generous “by allowing the jury to consider ... evidence of particular 
lenders’ standards that might have squeaked its way into the rec-
ord.”180 Just to make sure that the principles enunciated by 
Lindsey II were not misinterpreted by the district courts, the 
Ninth Circuit laid out its four holdings as follows: 
In conclusion, we hold the following: (1) negligence is not a defense 
to wire fraud, and evidence of lender negligence is not admis-
sible as a defense to mortgage fraud; (2) intentional disregard 
of relevant information is not a defense to wire fraud, and ev-
idence of intentional disregard by lenders is not admissible as 
a defense to mortgage fraud; (3) evidence of individual lender 
behavior is not admissible to disprove materiality, but evidence 
of general lending standards in the mortgage industry is admis-
sible to disprove materiality; and (4) the district court did not 
deny Lindsey the opportunity to present a complete defense.181
 The Ninth Circuit thus drew a clear line: criminal mortgage 
fraud defendants can challenge the materiality of false statements 
177 A similar point is made by the Fourth Circuit in Raza. See infra notes 
207–08 and accompanying text. 
178 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017. 
179 Id. at 1019 (explaining that throughout the trial, “the district court allowed 
Lindsey to argue and present evidence that his false statements were not mate-
rial in light of general industry lending standards”). 
180 Id.
181 Id.
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with evidence about industry practices,182 but are forbidden from 
introducing or relying on evidence about individual lenders.183
In Judge Gould’s view, “[t]his line between evidence of industry 
practice and the practice of particular lenders is subtle,”184 but it 
reflects the best way to respect both Escobar and the objective 
conception of materiality in federal criminal fraud cases.185
D. United States v. Raza 
1. Background
 In United States v. Raza, the Fourth Circuit also addressed 
the implications of Escobar on criminal fraud cases involving fi-
nancial institutions.186 The Raza panel had the benefit not only of 
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Escobar, but also the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion in Lindsey II. The fraud scheme in Raza involved four em-
ployees of the SunTrust Mortgage branch in Annandale, Virginia:187
Mohsin Raza managed the branch; Raza’s wife, Humaira Iqbal, 
worked as his personal assistant; and Farukh Iqbal and Mohammad 
Ali Haider, both of whom are Humaira’s brothers, worked as loan 
officers in the same SunTrust office.188 Raza and Humaira also acted 
as loan officers at the branch.189 The fraud scheme was extensive:190
it involved twenty-five mortgage loans made on thirteen properties 
in Virginia.191 As the Fourth Circuit exhaustively detailed, the four 
182 Id. at 1016. As an example, Judge Gould explained that “defendants can 
offer testimony about the types of information, such as household income or assets, 
that lenders typically consider, as well as evidence of how much weight the 
industry generally gives to statements about such information.” Id.
183 Id. (“As long as defendants do not stray into evidence of the behavior of 
individual lenders—for instance, evidence of specific prior bad loans or par-
ticular mistakes by underwriters—defendants may attack materiality though 
industry practice.”). 
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1016–17. 
186 United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 619–21 (4th Cir. 2017). 
187 Id. at 607. The Fourth Circuit explained that the fraud scheme affected 
both parent and subsidiary banking entities, but that the distinctions between 
the entities were immaterial for the purpose of the discussion. Id. at 606 n.1. 
188 Id. at 608. 
189 Id.
190 See id. at 607 n.6 (describing key elements of the indictment). 
191 Id. at 607. 
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defendants helped to originate numerous mortgage loan applica-
tions containing inaccurate borrower information—especially with 
respect to job titles, income, and bank savings on deposit.192 These 
mortgage applications often were supported by false tax and payroll 
documents obtained or prepared by the defendants.193 Many of 
the false tax documents were produced by Ranjit Singh, a tax 
preparer who cooperated with the prosecution.194
It is vitally important to note that the jury was apprised not 
only of the facts of these mortgage loan application misrepresen-
tations, but also that the jurors heard testimony as to why such 
192 Astonishingly enough, the four defendants in Raza claimed to have worked 
at SunTrust for only a year, during the pre–Great Recession mortgage lending 
boom, and that the government waited nine years to indict them for their crimes. 
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (No. 17-1314), available on Westlaw at 
2018 WL 1394194, at 3–4 [hereinafter Raza Cert. Petition]. 
193 Raza, 876 F.3d at 609–10. They even had a branch employee impersonate 
a tenant’s landlord to confirm rental information with SunTrust’s underwriters. 
Id. at 609. 
194 Id. Seven vivid examples will give the reader a sense of the types of 
misrepresentations involved in the Raza mortgage fraud scheme: (1) Reynaldo 
Valdez, obtained a home mortgage loan for $414,000 from SunTrust. Id. at 610. 
His application indicated that he was a dentist who earned over $100,000 per 
year and that he had almost $70,000 in the bank. Id. In reality, he worked in 
his sister’s medical office doing clerical and maintenance work for far less 
income. Id. (2) Harwinder Singh, obtained $470,000 in SunTrust mortgage loans 
in his wife’s name. Id. The loan application stated that Mrs. Singh worked as 
a systems engineer and that she made almost $15,000 per month and had 
$45,000 on deposit at Wachovia Bank. Id. In fact, she earned only $25,000 per 
year and did not have a bank account with Wachovia. Id. (3) Santos Valdez-Mejia, 
who worked as a cook and a manual laborer, obtained $405,000 in mortgage 
loans from SunTrust. Id. at 610–11. His loan file indicated that he earned almost 
$10,000 per month and that he worked as an area manager for a restaurant 
chain. Id. at 610. (4) Francy Castillo’s loan application falsely stated that she 
“was president of a company called NGDC, earned a monthly salary of $17,000, 
and had $100,000 in a Wachovia bank.” Id. at 611. In reality, Castillo worked “two 
hourly jobs—as a waitress and as a caretaker,” and “she never had $100,000 
in any bank.” Id. (5) Khalid Yousaf, a cab driver, who also operated a Dollar 
Store. Id. Yousaf earned about $3,000 per month, but his mortgage refinancing 
application falsely stated that he was a vice president of a business and that 
he earned $13,000 per month. Id. (6) Juan Pablo Yanez’s loan application 
“reflected that he was president of a construction company and earned more than 
$11,000 per month,” but he “was actually a laborer earning hourly wages.” Id. (7)
Finally, Jagtar Dhanoa worked as a cab driver and at Pizza Hut as a cook, but his 
loan application “falsely indicated he was a senior analyst at Ikon Solutions.” Id. 
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information was significant in the lending process.195 In particular, 
“Barbara Daloia, a vice-president of SunTrust’s national under-
writing team in North Carolina, explained the potential conse-
quences to SunTrust of loan applicants failing to submit accurate 
information on mortgage loan applications.”196 Daloia also “em-
phasized the significance to SunTrust of the information required 
on its loan applications,”197 and “stressed that supporting docu-
ments were similarly important to SunTrust’s loan process—
such as those required for full document loans and stated income, 
stated asset loans—because those documents authenticate the 
information on the loan application.”198
 Just as important, the defendants in Raza were permitted 
to have their own witnesses testify about SunTrust’s “originate-
to-sell” mortgage business model199 and the firm’s purportedly 
reckless lending policies during the period of the alleged mortgage 
fraud scheme.200 According to a former SunTrust underwriter, 
Terri Dougherty: 
195 Id. at 611–12. 
196 Id. at 611. 
197 Id. at 612. 
198 Id.
199 Id.; see also FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 542 (2011), https://www
.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6AQ  
-NBAJ] (defining “originate-to-distribute” as “[w]hen lenders make loans with 
the intention of selling them to other financial institutions or investors, as 
opposed to holding the loans through maturity”). One scholar explains: 
A more sophisticated secondary market for mortgages developed 
in the 1970s. Banks, aided by the GSEs, began to securitize mort-
gages, selling pools of mortgage loans to intermediaries who sold 
securities backed by those loans to investors. Investors in the 
securitized mortgages then bore the interest rate, prepayment, 
and default risk associated with the underlying loans apart from 
a small residual interest typically maintained by the originator. 
Many banks thus moved from an originate-to-hold model to 
an originate-to-distribute model, transferring most of their mort-
gage loans to special purpose vehicles that issued and sold se-
curities to investors. 
Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, 104 VA. L. REV. 235,
243 (2018) (footnote omitted). 
200 Raza, 876 F.3d at 612–13. 
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SunTrust aggressively sought to originate mortgage loans in 
order to sell them on the secondary mortgage market. SunTrust 
attempted to sell loans immediately after origination, before 
the SunTrust borrowers could default and undermine the loans’ 
marketability. Dougherty believed this business model en-
couraged SunTrust employees to prioritize economic metrics 
that attracted secondary loan purchasers—such as good credit 
scores of borrowers—and to disregard other information on the 
SunTrust loan applications. For example, Dougherty asserted 
that SunTrust discouraged its mortgage loan underwriters from 
raising red flags when loan applications contained questionable 
information concerning income, employment, and assets, so long 
as the borrowers’ credit scores were adequate. Dougherty also 
maintained that SunTrust supervisors would sometimes over-
ride her decisions to defer action on loan applications and to 
request additional supporting documents.201
 Another expert witness for the defense, Robert MacLaverty 
opined that: 
SunTrust’s mid-Atlantic region had engaged in reckless lending 
practices and approved more than ninety-eight percent of its 
residential mortgage loan applications during the period of the 
fraud scheme .... In contrast, SunTrust’s competitors approved 
about eighty percent of similar loan applications during that 
period .... MacLaverty believed that secondary market purchasers 
deemed credit scores of borrowers to be one of the most im-
portant economic metrics in their evaluations of loan acquisi-
tions .... MacLaverty further opined that SunTrust’s pattern 
of expeditiously selling originated loans to secondary market 
purchasers minimized SunTrust’s exposure to the risk of bor-
rowers defaulting on SunTrust loans.202
Thus, the defendants in Raza were quite successful at getting 
their “reckless lender” story in front of the jury, even if they 
were unable to obtain the jury charge on materiality that they 
wanted from the district court.203
 After a jury trial, all four defendants were convicted of 
wire fraud involving a financial institution and conspiracy to 
201 Id. at 612. 
202 Id. at 612–13 
203 Id. at 615 (noting that the defendants’ witnesses were able to testify “that 
SunTrust had engaged in reckless lending practices and disregarded false 
information in loan applications”). 
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commit wire fraud.204 On appeal, the defendants argued that the 
trial court’s instruction as to materiality was defective because 
“the court erroneously gave the jury an objective—or ‘reasonable 
lender’—standard of materiality,”205 where it should have ad-
vised “the jury that it had to find ... that the defendants’ misrep-
resentations and false statements were subjectively material to 
the fraud’s victim.”206 As in Lindsey II, the defendants in Raza
specifically invoked Escobar.207 The Fourth Circuit explained: 
“The defendants’ contention of error on the materiality element 
apparently comes to this: They want us to utilize [Escobar] to 
rule that the Supreme Court has clarified its earlier cases to say 
that materiality—in any criminal fraud context—requires proof 
that the false statements and misrepresentations were subjec-
tively material.”208
2. The Raza Decision 
 In the end, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants’ ar-
guments regarding materiality.209 The Raza court arrived at two 
related legal conclusions similar to Lindsey II: first, an objective 
standard of materiality applies in cases involving fraud against 
private lenders; and second, nothing in Escobar changes that 
principle or warrants the application of a subjective materiality 
standard in criminal fraud cases involving financial institutions.210
As for the first point, the Raza court relied heavily on Neder,211
in addition to a recent Fourth Circuit bank fraud case, United 
States v. Wolf.212 According to the Court of Appeals, in Neder,
“the Supreme Court endorsed an objective, reasonable person 
204 Id. at 607. 
205 Id. at 614. The defendants raised two other arguments on appeal, which 
will not be addressed here. Id. at 613. This Article will limit its focus to the 
materiality issue. 
206 Id. at 614. 
207 Id. at 615. 
208 Id. at 620. 
209 Id. at 621. 
210 Id. at 620–21. 
211 Id. at 616–18. 
212 United States v. Wolf, 860 F.3d 175, 193 (4th Cir. 2017). Even though 
Wolf was decided more than a year after Escobar, the panel in Wolf did not address 
the implications of Escobar. See Raza, 876 F.3d at 619 n.8. 
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standard for materiality in the context of wire fraud against 
private lending institutions.”213 Moreover, in Wolf, the Court of 
Appeals plainly stated that “the test for whether a false state-
ment to a bank is material is an objective one; it does not change 
from bank to bank.”214 Instead, as Raza explained, “frauds perpe-
trated on private lending institutions are judged according to an 
objective, ‘reasonable financial institution’ standard.”215 Although 
the Fourth Circuit’s endorsement of an objective materiality test 
in Raza was accompanied by additional discussion, the combina-
tion of Raza’s reading of Neder and the recent circuit precedent 
in Wolf pretty much settled the issue for the Court of Appeals.216
 The only question, then, for the Fourth Circuit was whether 
Escobar somehow dictated a contrary outcome and thus, perhaps, 
whether Wolf was erroneously decided.217 The answer was no. 
The Court of Appeals determined that Escobar’s more subjective 
materiality standard does not apply in criminal fraud cases in-
volving financial institutions,218 contending that it was unlikely 
213 Raza, 876 F.3d at 618 (“In determining that Congress intended to in-
corporate common law materiality principles into those offenses, the Neder Court 
relied on the objective materiality test spelled out in the Second Restatement of 
Torts.”) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999)). Oddly, as Raza 
cites Neder citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts here, the second subpart of 
the Restatement’s materiality test (the subjective prong) seems to vanish. Id.
214 Wolf, 860 F.3d at 193; Raza, 876 F.3d at 618 (discussing Wolf).
215 See Raza, 876 F.3d at 618 (“More than fifteen years prior to Wolf—and 
post-Neder—our Court explained that frauds perpetrated on private lending 
institutions are judged according to an objective, ‘reasonable financial insti-
tution’ standard.” (citing United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 903 n.5 (4th 
Cir. 2000))). 
216 Id. at 618. 
217 Id. at 619 (explaining that the defendants specifically argued that Wolf 
was wrongly decided in light of Escobar).
218 One argument proffered by the panel in Raza against the extension of 
Escobar will not be explored in depth here. The Fourth Circuit noted that Justice 
Thomas actually cited both objective and subjective materiality tests in Escobar,
and then opined that there is no true tension between the objective and subjec-
tive materiality tests in this context. See id. at 621 (“The Court’s juxtaposi-
tion of those two standards suggests that they are not in tension. Put another 
way, an objective test of materiality does in fact ‘look to the effect on the likely or 
actual behavior of the recipient.’” (quoting Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002)). Raza 
then concluded that both standards lead to the conclusion that “the jury should 
assess in its materiality inquiry is a reasonable lender in SunTrust’s position—
not necessarily SunTrust itself.” Id. Regardless of whether the ultimate conclusion 
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that Escobar extended past qui tam actions that protect the federal 
government.219 In support of this point, Raza cited a recent case, 
United States v. Palin,220 in which the Fourth Circuit had declined 
to apply Escobar in the context of health care fraud, stating: “We 
do not believe the Supreme Court intended to broadly ‘overrule’ 
materiality standards that had previously applied in the context 
of criminal fraud.”221 The Fourth Circuit then distinguished cases 
like Escobar, which “involved a civil fraud scheme that had tar-
geted the federal government,” from cases involving private 
lenders.222 As the Fourth Circuit explained, “when the victim is 
the government, the prosecution must prove materiality by ref-
erence to the particular government agency or public officials that 
were targeted,”223 therefore “[i]n such a circumstance, the appli-
cable materiality test verges toward a subjective standard.”224 Ac-
cordingly, in cases involving false statements made to government 
agencies or public decision-making bodies, subjective materiality 
evidence (i.e., how the targeted decision-maker would respond or 
actually has responded in the past to such misrepresentations) 
is relevant.225 In fact, not only would such evidence be admissible 
for the defense, the prosecution might need to proffer such sub-
jective materiality evidence to establish its case-in-chief. 
 Although subjective materiality evidence might be rele-
vant in a case involving fraud against the government, according 
to Raza, the same is not true for cases involving fraud against 
is correct (which it very well may be) the reasoning leading there in this paragraph 
of Raza is rather opaque. It is not evident how Escobar’s citation of both materi-
ality standards, without more, leads to the conclusion that the two standards 
are not in tension, nor why this means that a reasonable lender standard neces-
sarily applies in all cases. Once again, the conclusion may be correct, but the 
reasoning requires further elaboration. 
219 See id. at 620. 
220 Id. (citing United States v. Palin, 874 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2017)). 
221 Palin, 874 F.3d at 423. 
222 Raza, 876 F.3d at 621. 
223 Id. at 617. 
224 Id. at 621; see also id. at 616 (“Pursuant to Neder, the test for materiality 
in a fraud scheme targeting the federal government verges toward the subjec-
tive.”) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (2019)). 
225 Id. at 617 (citing cases involving false statements to public decision-making 
bodies, including United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206, 1217–19 (10th Cir. 
2015); United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160, 174 (2d Cir. 2015); and United 
States v. Ismail, 97 F.3d 50 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
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financial institutions.226 To support this point, Raza quoted Lindsey 
II, to illuminate why a single private lender in the mortgage 
market is not analogous to the federal government: 
A single lender represents only some small part of the market 
for issuing mortgages. The Federal Government, by contrast, 
represents the entire market for issuing federal government 
contracts. The weight the Government gives to a particular 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement is analogous 
not to the weight an individual lender gives to a statement on 
its loan application, but rather the weight the entire mortgage 
industry gives to that type of statement.227
 In sum, like the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II, the Fourth 
Circuit in Raza declined to extend the Escobar Court’s subjective 
materiality standard to cases involving criminal frauds perpetrated 
against private lenders or financial institutions.228 Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the district court did not err by refusing to give 
the materiality instruction requested by the defendants.229
E. Summary: The Key Lesson of Lindsey II and Raza
 There is one key lesson that can be drawn from Lindsey II 
and Raza: the federal courts of appeals thus far have rejected 
defendants’ arguments that the “subjective”230 materiality standard 
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Escobar should 
be applied to criminal fraud cases involving financial institu-
tions.231 This has been a losing argument. Instead, the circuit 
226 Id. at 616. 
227 Id. at 621 (quoting Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
228 Id. at 620. 
229 Id. at 621.
230 The characterization of the Escobar standard as “subjective” could be 
debated. See Dawkins, supra note 107, at 178 (asserting that “[u]nder Escobar,
the government and relators must meet both the objective and subjective stand-
ards when judging if a misrepresentation was material to the decision to its pay”) 
(footnotes omitted). But this is the argument pressed by criminal fraud defend-
ants, so it is suitable for the purposes of this discussion. Raza, 876 F.3d at 620. 
231 See United States v. Robertson, 760 F. App’x 214, 219–20 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Raza, 876 F.3d at 620) (explaining that Raza “noted that the subjective 
materiality standard articulated by the Supreme Court in [Escobar] ... a False 
Claims Act case—likely does not extend ‘beyond the context of qui tam ac-
tions,’ which are ‘civil proceeding[s] that protect[ ] the federal government’”). 
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courts to consider the issue in Escobar’s wake steadfastly have 
maintained that an objective materiality standard applies in mail, 
wire and bank fraud cases.232 As the Fourth Circuit stated in Raza:
“[T]he correct test for materiality ... is an objective one, which 
measures a misrepresentation’s capacity to influence an objective 
‘reasonable lender,’ not a renegade lender with a demonstrated 
habit of disregarding materially false information.”233
IV. MATERIALITY EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL FRAUD CASES
A. Lindsey II’s Prophylactic Rules 
 Although Lindsey II and Raza arrived at basically the same 
conclusion with respect to post-Escobar materiality standards in 
federal fraud cases involving financial institutions, the Ninth 
and Fourth Circuits differed in one fundamental manner: how to 
treat the admission of evidence regarding lending practices. As 
discussed earlier, in Lindsey II, the Ninth Circuit specifically 
held that neither evidence of lender negligence nor evidence of 
intentional regard of relevant information could be admissible as 
a defense in a criminal mortgage fraud case.234 The Ninth Circuit 
went further, however, holding that “evidence of individual lender 
behavior is not admissible to disprove materiality, but evidence 
232 See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1014–17; United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 
F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hether a statement is material depends on 
its effect on ‘a reasonable person’—or, in this case, a reasonable lender.”); Raza,
876 F.3d at 620–21; see also United States v. Lucas, 709 F. App’x. 119, 123 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“[M]ateriality is an objective test, and requires showing that a 
defendant’s misrepresentations would have been important to a reasonable person 
deciding whether to take the requested action, not that the victim actually relied 
on those misrepresentations.”); United States v. Mazumder, 800 F. App’x 392, 
396 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the concept of materiality ... involves the 
tendency or capacity to influence a reasonable person’s decision and does not 
require actual reliance on the part of the victim”); Shin v. United States, No. CR 
04-00150 SOM, 2017 WL 2802866, at *22 (D. Haw. June 28, 2017) (“Escobar
does not alter the applicable objective materiality standard. Rather, Escobar
clarifies what types of evidence may be relevant in proving materiality depending 
on the facts of a particular case. Lindsey II clearly emphasizes that materiality 
continues to be evaluated under an objective standard and applies that standard 
in the wire fraud context.”). 
233 Raza, 876 F.3d at 621. 
234 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1019. 
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of general lending standards in the mortgage industry is admis-
sible to disprove materiality.”235 Thus, the Ninth Circuit went 
from a per se materiality rule in Lindsey I, which would have 
made virtually all evidence about materiality outside of the loan 
application itself and any supporting documents irrelevant and 
inadmissible,236 to a prophylactic “bright-line rule against evi-
dence of individual lender behavior”237 in Lindsey II.
 Needless to say, the Ninth Circuit did not have to bake its 
conclusions about materiality into rigid evidentiary rules in 
Lindsey II. The Lindsey II panel itself acknowledged that it was 
making an explicit policy judgment that a prophylactic eviden-
tiary rule was superior to the alternatives.238 In fact, the Court 
of Appeals identified one possible option as follows: “We recog-
nize that an alternative possible rule would be to allow evidence 
of past behavior by individual lenders, but require a jury instruction 
that the evidence be considered only for the purpose of evaluating 
materiality, and not negligence, intentional disregard, or lack of 
reliance.”239 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected other such 
approaches, asserting that because “individual lender behavior 
can easily touch on lender negligence, intentional disregard, or 
lack of reliance—none of which is a defense to mortgage fraud,”240
permitting “evidence of prior non-reliance by lenders would still 
lead factfinders to consider whether the victims themselves re-
lied on the defendant’s false statements.”241 The Lindsey II panel 
thus concluded that “[a] prophylactic rule against all evidence of 
individual lender behavior best avoids” the court’s concerns 
about jury confusion.242
235 Id.
236 See supra notes 135–61 and accompanying text (discussing the per se 
materiality rule established by Lindsey I). 
237 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017. 
238 Id. at 1018. 
239 Id. at 1017 (citations omitted). 
240 Id.
241 Id. at 1018. Lindsey II also cites FED. R. EVID. 403, which states: “The 
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly present-
ing cumulative evidence.” 
242 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1018. 
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B. Supervisory Powers 
 Lindsey II does not explain the source of its authority to 
establish these prophylactic evidentiary rules for future criminal 
fraud cases. This is not to say that the Ninth Circuit acted out-
side of its authority, but merely to note that it is not addressed 
in Judge Gould’s opinion. It could be claimed, perhaps, that the 
Ninth Circuit was acting pursuant to what are sometimes called 
supervisory authority or supervisory powers.243 The sources and 
scope of the federal courts’ supervisory powers have been the 
subject of significant scholarly attention.244 Questions about the 
limits of supervisory powers run even deeper when it is the fed-
eral courts of appeals, as opposed to the Supreme Court,245 that 
are exercising these implicit powers.246 Nevertheless, in Thomas
v. Arn, the Supreme Court asserted: “It cannot be doubted that 
the courts of appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at 
the least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing the 
management of litigation.”247 Thus, there is plausible authority 
for the Ninth Circuit’s action here.248
243 See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 330 (2006) (“In some instances, courts use the term 
‘supervisory authority’ to refer to the power of an appellate court to supervise 
lower courts by prescribing procedures for them above and beyond those required 
by statutory and constitutional provisions.”). 
244 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal 
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); Barrett, supra note 243. 
245 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“The law in this 
area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and 
we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are 
binding in those tribunals.”) (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 
426 (1996)). 
246 See 15A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3901 (2d ed. 1984) (referring to the courts’ of appeals’ 
supervisory powers as “scantily defined”); see also United States v. Strothers, 
77 F.3d 1389, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (asserting that 
“unclear ... where the courts of appeals derive the power to control the practice of 
the district courts when it is not constitutionally mandated”).  
247 Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985). 
248 Given the uncertain boundaries of the federal appellate courts’ supervi-
sory powers, an argument could be made that the Ninth Circuit went too far 
in Lindsey II. But resolving that question would require a deep dive into the 
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 Of course, it could be argued instead that the Lindsey II 
court was not truly engaged in rulemaking or policymaking at 
all, but merely was stating the holdings for the case in front of it 
and thus observing what existing federal law would require or 
forbid in similar financial fraud cases. To accept this view, we 
would need to believe that the particular evidentiary rules es-
tablished by the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II are compelled by 
applicable precedents, statutory language and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. In other words, we would have to accept that these 
prophylactic evidentiary rules are mandated by existing law, not 
just within the exercise of the court’s discretion. If we accept this 
view, then other courts of appeals that do not arrive at the same 
conclusion and do not implement such rules would be commit-
ting legal error. This seems like a dubious proposition given that 
nothing in either the federal wire fraud statute or Supreme 
Court precedents mandated such expansive bright-line eviden-
tiary rules.249 It seems more likely that the Ninth Circuit was 
exercising some form of discretion to establish these rules. 
C. Alternative Evidentiary Approaches 
 Thus far, no other federal appellate court has adopted 
Lindsey II’s prophylactic materiality evidence rules. In Raza, the 
Fourth Circuit specifically declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s 
lead, stating: 
The Ninth Circuit appears to have barred the evidentiary use 
of a lender’s past lending practices on the materiality issue. 
In explaining that step, it related that “lending standards ap-
plied by an individual lender are poor evidence of a false 
statement’s intrinsic ability to affect decision making” .... Al-
though we need not go so far, we understand the rationale for 
the Lindsey court’s wholesale rejection of such evidence.250
 Given the ultimate outcome in Raza, one can see why the 
Fourth Circuit may not have felt compelled to go down Lindsey
federal appellate courts’ supervisory powers in matters covered by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence—a matter that is far beyond this Article’s scope. 
249 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud). 
250 See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 621 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1018). 
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II’s path. After all, as noted above, the jury in Raza was presented 
with evidence of uninspiring if not outright reckless lender be-
havior, as well as information about the lender’s potentially per-
ilous originate-to-distribute mortgage lending model.251 Despite 
this evidence, the jury still convicted all four defendants in Raza 
for their respective roles in the mortgage fraud scheme.252 Hence, 
the Fourth Circuit may not have seen any urgent need for prophy-
lactic evidentiary rules, given the ease with which materiality 
can be established in many mortgage fraud cases, and the ap-
parent absence of juror confusion in the Raza case itself.253
 Even without adopting Lindsey II’s prophylactic materiality 
rules, other courts have accepted the Ninth Circuit’s assertion in 
Lindsey II that “the lending standards applied by an individual 
lender are poor evidence of a false statement’s intrinsic ability to 
affect decision making.”254 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Betts-
Gaston illustrates this point.255 The defendant Betts-Gaston argued 
that mortgage applications at issue “were not materially false 
because the lenders did not care about the information the appli-
cations requested, such as the borrower’s income.”256 The district 
court excluded Betts-Gaston’s evidence including expert testimony 
“that the lenders’ business model depended on generating large 
volumes of mortgage loans without regard for the borrower’s 
ability to pay.”257 The court concluded that such testimony would be 
irrelevant and confusing to the jury.258 Moreover, the district court 
sustained the government’s objections to proposed defense cross-
examination “on whether the lenders cared about or tried to 
verify loan application claims.”259 The Seventh Circuit found no 
error, explaining: 
Betts-Gaston argues that those rulings were errors because the 
expert’s testimony and the cross-examination questions were rele-
vant to the materiality of the loan applications’ false statements. 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 209–29. 
252 Raza, 876 F.3d at 606. 
253 Id. at 624. 
254 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1018. 
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We disagree. Betts-Gaston wanted to convince the jury that the 
lenders involved here routinely behaved unreasonably—that, 
as a matter of policy, they ignored information that a reasonable 
lender would consider, like the borrower’s income .... But whether 
a statement is material depends on its effect on “a reasonable 
person”—or, in this case, a reasonable lender .... Whether a par-
ticular lender or group of lenders was in fact reasonable is ir-
relevant to that question.260
 Thus, even though the Seventh Circuit has not adopted 
Lindsey II’s evidentiary rules, it did accept one motivating ra-
tionale underlying these rules: that how a target financial insti-
tution actually responded to misstatements is not probative as 
to how a reasonable decision-maker would have responded to 
such falsehoods.261 The factual assumption underlying Lindsey
II and Betts-Gaston could, of course, be challenged in a particular 
case. One could imagine a defendant arguing that a particular 
bank’s employees are eminently reasonable agents of a prudent 
financial institution. If so, their lending practices might be repre-
sentative of industry norms (or the norms of a significant sector 
of the industry) and understanding the specific bank’s approach 
to lending decisions might be useful to a jury.262 Nevertheless, 
under Lindsey II, the proffer of such evidence by the defendant 
is forbidden,263 and under Betts-Gaston and Raza, the exclusion 
of such evidence almost certainly would not be an abuse of the 
trial judge’s discretion.264
D. A Gate that Swings One Way? 
 A recent federal district court case illustrates an additional 
challenge that defendants face under Lindsey II’s evidentiary 
260 Id.
261 Id. at 522–23. 
262 Prior to Lindsey II, a federal district court in California noted in an un-
published decision: “Whether, and to what extent, a jury must know about the 
lenders’ decision-making process in a mortgage fraud prosecution would appear 
to be an issue over which reasonable minds might disagree.” United States v. 
Kuzmenko, No. 2:11-CR-0210 JAM, 2014 WL 7140640, at *6 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 12, 2014) (collecting cases). 
263 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017). 
264 Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d at 532–33; Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 614, 625 (4th 
Cir. 2017). 
2021] FRAUD AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 671 
regime. In United States v. Casher, the defendant, an employee 
of Rocky Mountain Bank (RMB), argued that the government 
should not have been permitted to introduce evidence of RMB’s 
“lending practices and whether RMB relied on the alleged mis-
representations.”265 Casher argued that “RMB’s behavior—the 
behavior of an individual bank—is inadmissible because whether 
or not RMB did or did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations 
is not an element of bank fraud or relevant to the materiality 
inquiry.”266 In other words, the defendant claimed that the ruling 
in Lindsey II is “a gate that swings both ways,”267 barring both 
the defendant and the government from introducing evidence 
related to a specific lender’s practices. 
 The district court rejected this argument.268 First, the dis-
trict court explained that the government “must establish that the 
allegedly false statements were, in fact, false,” which requires 
providing the jury with necessary context related to the bank’s 
loan consideration process.269 Furthermore, the defendant, Casher, 
was a loan officer and market president for RMB who approved 
the loans at issue in the case,270 so evidence of his role was “rel-
evant to the Government’s case at a fundamental level.”271
 Second, the district court explained that although Lindsey 
II “limits a defendant from admitting evidence of lender behav-
ior to avoid confusing the jury into believing actual reliance on a 
defendant’s false statements is an element of fraud,”272 on the 
other hand, “[t]he Government … is free to introduce this evi-
dence when it attempts to demonstrate that the defendant’s 
statements were false and material.”273 In fact, the court noted 
265 United States v. Casher, No. CR 19-65-BLG-SPW, 2020 WL 2557849, 
at *1–2 (D. Mont. May 20, 2020). 
266 Id. at *2. 
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at *2. 
270 According to the superseding indictment, the defendant, Casher, made 
private loans to Larry Price, “while simultaneously approving loans, in Casher’s 
capacity as a loan officer and market president of RMB, to entities controlled 
by Price and for which Price was a guarantor—all without disclosing the private 
loans to RMB.” Id. at *1. 
271 Id. at *2. 
272 Id.
273 Id.
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that Casher had been “unable to provide any cases where a court 
prevented the Government from admitting evidence of a victim 
bank’s loan process regarding the loans at issue or of actual reli-
ance on a defendant’s misrepresentations.”274 The district court’s 
reasoning boiled down to one key conclusion: “[E]vidence of non-
reliance is highly prejudicial to the Government, but evidence of 
reliance is not highly prejudicial to the defense.”275 Why is this 
the case? Why does Lindsey II’s evidentiary gate only swing one 
way? The district court explained: 
If a defendant submits evidence of negligent reliance or evidence 
of other bad loan practices, the evidence is highly prejudicial and 
misleading because it implies the Government must prove an 
additional element: actual reliance. The Court would most likely 
find the probative value of the lender’s past behavior (if any 
probative value existed) was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and mislead-
ing the jury.276
 According to Casher, the same conclusion does follow, how-
ever, if it is the government, and not the defendant, who seeks to 
introduce such reliance evidence: 
On the other hand, if the Government introduces evidence of 
actual reliance, the evidence is not highly prejudicial to the 
defendant because it does not, for example, reduce the number of 
elements the Government must prove. Rather, actual reliance 
can be highly probative of whether the allegedly false statements 
were material. The jury is then left to decide whether the victim 
bank’s subjective reliance on the false statements indicates the 
false statements were objectively material. If necessary, the Court 
could accept a limiting instruction explaining as much.277
 The emphasized part of the quote above is essential. Ac-
cording the district court in Casher, evidence of actual reliance 
tends to prove materiality, but even if evidence of non-reliance 
could tend to prove immateriality such evidence is highly preju-
dicial and misleading.278 Thus, in the case at hand, the district 
274 Id.
275 Id. at *3. 
276 Id.
277 Id. (emphasis added). 
278 Id.
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court ruled that the government “might elicit testimony from RMB 
employees about the importance of the information contained in the 
loan documents,”279 and “may also elicit testimony that RMB did 
rely on the false statements and likely would not have approved 
the loans at issue had it known of the misrepresentations.”280
 The district court did make two concessions to Casher.281
First, the court acknowledged that if the government opens the 
door by soliciting testimony regarding the bank’s actual reliance 
on the alleged misrepresentations to establish materiality, “the 
defendant may cross-examine and submit evidence of his own to 
cast doubt on whether the lenders did rely on the false statements 
and whether the information was capable of influencing their 
decision-making.”282 The court cautioned: “However, the defendant 
could only submit contrasting evidence for this limited purpose (e.g., 
he could not then submit evidence of other bad loans that the bank 
approved).”283 Second, the district court pointed out that under 
Lindsey II, the defendant “is free to rebut the Government’s evi-
dence by testimony of industry practices.”284 Thus, “Casher may 
attempt to show RMB acted unreasonably and that a reasonable 
bank would not have relied on the defendant’s false statements—
i.e., the misrepresentations were immaterial. Again, the jury would 
be left to decide, when comparing both parties’ evidence, whether 
the false statements were material.”285
 Casher thus illustrates an advantage that the government 
possesses in criminal fraud cases under Lindsey II: the govern-
ment may introduce evidence regarding a financial institution’s 
actual reliance to prove materiality, while the defendant may 
not touch on a bank’s lack of reliance (except to rebut the gov-
ernment’s reliance evidence).286 Defendants must steer clear of 
279 Id. at *2. 
280 Id. (citing United States v. Ovist, 2012 WL 5830296, at *7 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 
2012)) (“[T]o decide whether the false statements had a natural tendency to 
influence, or were capable of influencing, the decisions of the lenders, the jury 
must know something about the lenders’ decision-making process.”). 
281 See infra notes 282–85 and accompanying text. 
282 Casher, No. CR 19-65-BLG-SPW, 2020 WL 2557849, at *2 n.1. 
283 Id.
284 Id. at *3 (citing Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
285 Id.
286 See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017. 
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evidence regarding the target financial institution’s lack of actual 
reliance and, instead, focus on proof that a hypothetical reasonable 
lender would not have been sufficiently influenced—to whatever 
extent demanded by the law—by the defendant’s misrepresenta-
tions. As sensible as this might seem, it may not be easy for fraud 
defendants to explore the question of what a hypothetical financial 
institution might do without either entering forbidden reliance 
territory or, even worse, suggesting that the victim was somehow 
at fault for the defendant’s fraud, which is also problematic. The 
next and final part of this Article explores these complications. 
V. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MATERIALITY RECONSIDERED
A. Two Materiality Paths? 
 Throughout this Article, we have explored an issue that has 
concerned courts and lawyers since Neder was decided more 
than 20 years ago: whether an objective or subjective materiality 
test applies in mail, wire, and bank fraud cases involving finan-
cial institutions. The two case studies in this Article, Lindsey II 
and Raza, suggest that the answer to the question is simple: 
materiality in federal criminal fraud cases is judged under an 
objective standard.287 To paraphrase Raza, materiality requires 
that we focus on reasonable lenders and not renegade banks.288
Unfortunately, this answer may be misleading insofar as it sug-
gests that there is only one way to prove materiality.289 It is true 
287 See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text. 
288 See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d at 621 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he correct 
test for materiality ... is an objective one, which measures a misrepresentation’s 
capacity to influence an objective ‘reasonable lender,’ not a renegade lender 
with a demonstrated habit of disregarding materially false information.”). 
289 Thus far, criminal fraud defendants have been unsuccessful in their ef-
forts to get the Supreme Court to wade in further on this issue, despite their 
claims that a circuit split exists on materiality standards. See Raza Cert. Petition, 
supra note 192; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Betts-Gaston, 
860 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 689 (2018) (No. 17-705), 
available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 5433144. For example, Raza’s unsuccessful 
petition for a writ of certiorari argued: 
The circuits are intractably divided over the standard for prov-
ing materiality in federal fraud prosecutions involving a private, 
as opposed to a government, victim. For private victims, some 
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that the government can establish a criminal fraud case with 
objective materiality evidence based upon a reasonable lender.290
Numerous federal appellate court cases, including Lindsey II and
Raza, make this clear.291 For example, if mortgage loan applicants 
accused of fraud lied about their family income and provided 
falsified tax documents in support of their false income claims, 
the government would introduce evidence that prudent lenders 
care very much about a borrower’s income to establish the re-
quired element of materiality. The earlier discussion of Raza 
provided a myriad of examples of income, employment and sav-
ings misrepresentations in the context of mortgage fraud.292
circuits have held that a misrepresentation is material only if it 
could influence the decision of the actual decisionmaker to which 
the misrepresentation was addressed. Other circuits, by contrast, 
have held that a misrepresentation is material as long as it 
could influence the decision of a hypothetical “reasonable person.” 
Raza Cert. Petition, supra note 192, at 2 (asserting that “the circuits are 
deeply divided on a fundamental question: the standard for determining the 
materiality of a misrepresentation made to a private victim”); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Shin v. United States, No. CR 04-00150 SOM, 2017 WL 
2802866 (D. Haw. June 28, 2017), aff’d, 782 F. App’x. 595 (9th Cir. 2019), 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1123 (2020) (No.19-848), available online at 2020 WL 
93924 (“The Circuits disagree over the standard for proof of materiality in 
federal fraud prosecutions and disagree as to whether the ‘demanding’ mate-
riality requirement that necessitated clarification in [Escobar] altered how 
rigorously that standard must be imposed.”) (case involving False Statements 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3)). 
In contrast, the United States Solicitor General’s Office has taken the 
view that no true circuit split exists on the materiality standards in criminal 
fraud cases. Brief for the United States in Opposition, United States v. Raza, 
876 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (No. 17-1314), 
available online at 2018 WL 2299235, at 16–17 (collecting cases). Instead, the 
U.S. Government has asserted that “every court of appeals has stated that a 
false statement or omission is material if it is capable of influencing a reasonable 
decisionmaker.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 18–19 (“Petitioners cite no court of 
appeals decision holding that a misstatement or omission cannot be material 
if it is capable of influencing a reasonable decisionmaker, but not the intended 
victim.”); id. at 20 (asserting that no cases “turned on the difference between 
the fraud’s effect on the intended victim, as opposed to its effect on a reason-
able decisionmaker”). 
290 Raza, 876 F.3d at 621. 
291 See id.; see also Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2017). 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 194–96 (discussing Raza, 876 F.3d 
at 609–11). 
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 Furthermore, if the government establishes its case with 
objective materiality evidence, to disprove materiality, the defend-
ants could argue that a hypothetical reasonable lender would not 
have cared enough about the misrepresentations, thus rendering 
them immaterial. Obviously, that would be difficult to prove with 
respect to misstated job titles, income, and assets. On the other 
hand, it might be possible to establish a lack of materiality if the 
particular information requested by the lender typically is unim-
portant in lending decisions according to accepted industry norms. 
In Lindsey II, Judge Gould provided the following example: 
To illustrate, suppose a defendant is charged with wire fraud 
for falsely stating on a loan application that he was married. In 
such a case, it would be admissible for a defense expert to testify 
that, while mortgage applications usually ask about marital sta-
tus, the general practice in the industry is to ignore marital 
status when making lending decisions. The defendant could then 
argue in closing that his false statement about marriage was 
immaterial, and so the elements of wire fraud have not been 
proven. By contrast, a district court could properly exclude ev-
idence that (a) the particular lender to whom the defendant 
lied did not generally give weight to marital status when decid-
ing whether to lend, or (b) there were prior instances in which 
that lender did not consider marital status in making loans.293
 Nevertheless, the fact that the government may (and typ-
ically will) establish its case with objective materiality evidence 
does not necessarily mean that the government is precluded from 
establishing a criminal fraud case with subjective materiality 
evidence instead.294 Thus, we can see why the plain answer above 
gleaned from Lindsey II and Raza—that materiality is judged 
according to an objective test—may be misleading. As the Eleventh 
Circuit observed in Svete: “The objective reliability of a misrep-
resentation is sufficient to establish its materiality, but proof of 
293 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1016. 
294 The Eleventh Circuit asserted that “[a]ll the sources cited by the Supreme 
Court” in Neder “support the proposition that materiality may be proved without 
establishing that the misrepresentation was objectively reliable.” United States 
v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1164 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc); see also Couture, supra
note 58, at 8 (noting that “[b]oth definitions of materiality cited in Neder include 
within their reach statements that an objectively reasonable person would not 
regard as important”). 
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objective reliability is not necessary to establish materiality if 
the defendant knows or should know that the victim is likely to 
regard the misrepresented facts as important.”295 Thus, under 
Svete, materiality can be established with either proof that a rea-
sonable person would have been sufficiently influenced by the 
defendant’s misrepresentations (objective materiality evidence) 
or proof that the defendant knew that the specific target or in-
tended recipient was likely to be influenced by the defendant’s 
misrepresentations, regardless of whether a reasonable person 
would have been so influenced (subjective materiality evidence).296
There are two alternative materiality paths.297
 In practice, however, one can assume it will be relatively rare 
for a federal criminal fraud case involving a financial institution 
295 Svete, 556 F.3d at 1165. 
296 Several authors have advocated in favor of a subjective materiality standard 
in federal fraud cases. See Couture, supra note 58, at 7 (asserting that “[i]n the 
wire and mail fraud context ... materiality is a subjective standard”); Lunsford, 
supra note 84, at 386 (“Based on the text, history, and current interpretations 
of the mail and wire fraud statutes, it is both the intent of Congress and the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court that the objective standard for materiality 
has no place in the federal statutory scheme for fraud crimes.”). A fair reading 
suggests that the argument being advanced in such scholarly works is that 
an objective materiality should not be applied to the exclusion of subjective 
materiality—not that subjective materiality alone should be the only path to 
proving fraud. This is the approach of the Eleventh Circuit in Svete, 556 F.3d 
at 1164–65. 
297 Recall the Restatement (Second) of Torts alternative definitions of ma-
teriality and the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition. See supra Section 
I.C.1. The first prong of the Restatement test embodies objective materiality: 
a matter is material if “a reasonable man would attach importance to its ex-
istence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction 
in question.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
The second prong of the Restatement materiality definition embodies subjec-
tive materiality: a matter is material if “the maker of the representation 
knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard 
the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a rea-
sonable man would not so regard it.” Id. § 538(2)(b). As discussed earlier, there is 
debate as to whether Neder intended that the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
materiality standards would apply in federal criminal fraud cases. See supra
notes 88–92 and accompanying text. The two prongs of the Restatement’s materi-
ality standard are being used here for illustration only. The Gaudin/Kungys
materiality definition similarly includes a subjective component. See Couture, 
supra note 39, at 80 (explaining that both materiality standards in Neder
include a subjective component). 
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to be predicated upon purely subjective materiality evidence. In 
civil contract and torts cases involving individuals there may be 
occasions where a fraudster preys on a person’s known idiosyn-
crasies,298 thus satisfying subjective materiality but not the ob-
jective materiality test. Charlie Brown might want to buy a used 
car once owned by his childhood baseball hero, Joe Shlabotnik,299
even if this fact of prior ownership would be of little interest to most 
reasonable auto consumers. Charlie Brown’s preference (if known) 
could be exploited by a sleazy used car salesperson. It seems less 
likely, however, that a bank or other financial institution would 
have idiosyncratic preferences, much less that a borrower would 
be aware of these unique preferences and then lie to a bank to 
exploit them. It is not impossible, of course, just not very likely. 
Thus, while theoretically, the government can establish materi-
ality with either objective or subjective materiality evidence in mail, 
wire and bank fraud cases, the use of objective materiality evi-
dence is more likely in cases involving financial institutions.300
B. Gullible Banks 
Alleged fraudsters may wish to argue that a financial institu-
tion or its staff was incompetent, unreasonable, or even complicit 
in the fraud scheme.301 Putting aside the law, we can see why a 
298 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
299 See Peanuts Wiki: Joe Shlabotnik, FANDOM, https://peanuts.fandom.com 
/wiki/Joe_Shlabotnik [https://perma.cc/E5U6-7XDR]. 
300 There are some unusual cases that might appear difficult to character-
ize on the objective/subjective divide. In one “rather unusual bank fraud case,” 
United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 234 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit 
explained: “If a bank’s discretion is limited by an agreement, we must look to 
the agreement to determine what factors are relevant, and when a misstate-
ment becomes material.” Id. at 235. This evidence might seem “subjective” in 
a sense in that the court is considering what the particular bank involved in 
the case might have done under the circumstances. Id. But this materiality 
evidence can also be viewed as “objective,” as the court is considering what a 
reasonable decision-maker, cabined by the applicable contractual agreements 
would have done under the circumstances. Id. (explaining that “[t]he only 
‘decisions’ that the bank could make, in the case the government presented to 
the jury, involved how much interest would be charged—an objective decision 
cabined by the ranges set in the Co-Borrowing Agreements”). 
301 It must also be pointed out that the victim under federal fraud statutes 
is the financial institution itself, not its duplicitous or incompetent staff. See
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criminal defense attorney would like the jury to hear about a 
lender’s culpability. Whether phrased in terms of a defendant’s 
lack of fraudulent intent or an absence of materiality in the de-
fendant’s misstatements, blaming the lender is likely to be a losing 
argument.302 Numerous federal appellate court opinions have held 
that it is no defense to criminal fraud that the victims were negli-
gent or gullible.303 According to the Fourth Circuit, this principle 
applies with equal force to banks and other financial institutions: 
The susceptibility of the victim of the fraud, in this case a finan-
cial institution, is irrelevant to the analysis: “If a scheme to 
defraud has been or is intended to be devised, it makes no differ-
ence whether the persons the schemers intended to defraud are 
Scott Mah et al., Financial Institutions Fraud, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 787, 800 
(2020) (“[K]nowledge of the scheme or even participation in the scheme by the 
defrauded bank’s officers adds no support to a ‘good faith’ defense because it is 
the financial institution itself, and not one of its officers, that is being defrauded.”) 
(citing United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Rackley, 986 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Saks, 
964 F.2d 1514, 1518–19 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Jimenez, 513 
F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Waldroop, 431 F.3d 736, 
742 (10th Cir. 2005)) (explaining that the financial institution, not its officers 
or agents, is the victim of a bank fraud scheme). 
302 See United States v. Gaver, No. 19-4026, 2020 WL 2770600, at *2 (4th 
Cir. May 28, 2020) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in excluding “certain evidence relating to the victims’ alleged negligence, 
complicity, or actual knowledge of [the defendant’s] fraudulent scheme”). 
303 United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(stating that “a defendant who intends to deceive the ignorant or gullible by 
preying on their infirmities is no less guilty” of mail fraud); United States v. 
Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he unreasonableness of a fraud 
victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does not bear on a defendant’s 
criminal intent in designing the fraudulent scheme, whereas the materiality 
of the false statement does.”). As the Second Circuit explains: 
The “unreasonable victim” argument misapprehends the function 
of the ordinary prudence standard. To establish a violation of 
the federal fraud statutes, the government must prove a scheme 
to defraud. Critical to this showing is evidence that the defendant 
“possessed a fraudulent intent.” The role of the ordinary prudence 
and comprehension standard is to assure that the defendant’s 
conduct was calculated to deceive, not to grant permission to 
take advantage of the stupid or careless. 
United States v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 2004) (footnote and cita-
tions omitted). 
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gullible or skeptical, dull or bright. These are criminal statutes, 
not tort concepts.”304
 Still, it must be acknowledged that there are some author-
ities—a minority view to be sure—that suggest that a criminal 
fraud conviction requires proof that that reasonable person would 
have been fooled by the defendant’s scheme.305 For example, the 
Sixth Circuit has asserted that “[a] fraudulent scheme must include 
a material misrepresentation, which is a misrepresentation that 
could influence the decision of a ‘person[ ] of ordinary prudence and 
comprehension.’”306 The Tenth Circuit has made similar claims.307
Despite such statements of law, it is hard to find appellate court 
decisions that have overturned federal fraud convictions because 
a fraud scheme that succeeded against a gullible target would 
not have fooled a reasonably prudent person.308 The trend in the 
law is clear: 
304 United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 903 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United 
States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir. 1980)). As Judge Posner once wrote 
for the Seventh Circuit: “It would be very odd for the law to protect only those 
who, being able to protect themselves, do not need the law’s protection. In fact 
picking on the vulnerable normally makes your conduct more rather than less 
culpable, earning you a heavier sentence.” United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 
330, 334 (7th Cir.1996). 
305 In Svete, Chief Judge Edmonson argued that the common law of fraud 
and the federal mail fraud statute require “the government ordinarily to 
show that the pertinent scheme or misrepresentation was capable of inducing 
reliance on the part of a reasonable person exercising ordinary prudence for 
the protection of his own interests.” Svete, 556 F.3d at 1170 (Edmondson, 
C.J., concurring in the result) (footnote omitted). 
306 United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762, 766 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting 
United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2005)); Jamieson,
427 F.3d at 415 (“It is well-established in this circuit that a scheme to defraud, as 
prohibited by the mail fraud statute, ‘must involve misrepresentations or 
omissions reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and 
comprehension.’” (quoting Berent v. Kemper Corp., 973 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (quoting Walters v. First Tennessee Bank, 855 F.2d 267, 273 (6th 
Cir. 1988)))). 
307 United States v. Fredette, 315 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating 
that “in order to prove a scheme to defraud, ‘the government must show con-
duct intended or reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence 
or comprehension’” (quoting United States v. Janusz, 135 F.3d 1319, 1323 
(10th Cir. 1998))). 
308 In Svete, the Eleventh Circuit overruled what may have been one such 
rare case, United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1996). See Svete,
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A few circuits have, without connecting their pronouncements 
to the materiality standard, stated that a fraudulent scheme must 
be credible enough to influence a reasonable person in order to 
be actionable as wire or mail fraud. The trend, however, is away 
from this minority rule and toward using the credibility of the 
scheme merely as an indicator of whether the defendant pos-
sessed the requisite intent to defraud.309
 What if a defendant instead argues that any reasonable 
financial institution would be too savvy or sophisticated to be 
fooled by a particular scheme? In one interesting case, bank fraud 
defendants argued that proof of materiality was not satisfied 
because the $15 million cashier’s check involved in the case “was 
so obviously fraudulent that no bank official could have been 
influenced to take any action in reliance on it.”310 In essence, the 
fraudsters were not saying that the victim was too gullible for their 
actions to count as fraud, rather they were arguing that their 
scheme was too dumb to count as criminal fraud.311 The Eighth 
Circuit rejected that argument, once again distinguishing mate-
riality from reliance: 
Here, the nature of the item itself was evidence of materiality. 
The evidence showed that defendants presented bank employees 
with a fraudulent Bank of America cashier’s check and made false 
statements about the check in order to influence the bank to 
negotiate it. The fact that the cashier’s check was obviously fraud-
ulent (apparently the check was the wrong size and printed 
on the wrong type of paper, the check was made out to bearer 
556 F.3d at 1168 (“According to one treatise, Brown ‘is the only major criminal 
case where the court absolved the defendants by finding unreasonable reliance by 
the alleged victim of fraud.’” (citing 1 JOEL ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
§ 8:2.70 (2d ed. 2006))). 
309 Couture, supra note 58, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted); see also Wang, supra
note 83, at 277–78 (stating that “some circuits may endorse the ‘reasonable 
person’ or ‘person of ordinary prudence’ definition: mail/wire fraud is material 
only if a ‘reasonable person’ would attach importance to the misstatement or 
nondisclosure,” whereas “[o]ther circuits have abandoned the ‘reasonable person’ 
standard of materiality in favor of the broader formulation: capable of influ-
encing the intended victim”). 
310 United States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Abu Nahia v. United States, 546 
U.S. 803 (2005). 
311 See Rashid, 383 F.3d at 772–73. The unsuccessful fraud scheme was 
discovered quite easily by bank personnel. See id.
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only, the bank logo was wrong, and the perforation was in the 
wrong place) does not mean that it was not material, that is, that 
it did not have a natural tendency to influence the bank or was 
not capable of influencing the bank. The fact that the bank was 
not actually influenced or actually deceived does not mean that 
the check and defendants’ false statements about the check were 
not material.312
 The outcome in Rashid seems tough to dispute given the 
defendant’s obvious fraudulent intent and the undisputed falsity 
of the $15 million check.313 But there is something curious in the 
Eighth Circuit’s materiality reasoning. Rashid implies that an 
“obviously fraudulent” check could have the natural tendency to 
influence or could be capable of influencing a bank.314 There is 
no explanation, however, as to why this is the case. If someone 
tries to deposit a suitcase full of Monopoly™ money at a bank 
and informs the teller that it is legal currency, would that be a 
material misrepresentation? Under Rashid, the falsehood could 
be material, though there seems to be something odd about that 
outcome given that no reasonable bank would or could be fooled 
in such a manner.315 How does a suitcase full of Monopoly™
money differ from a crudely created cashier’s check for $15 mil-
lion? The distinction is unclear. Perhaps the simple answer is 
that the Monopoly™ money scam could indeed land someone in 
federal prison, as absurd as that seems. 
C. Endemic Irrationality 
 The foregoing discussion leads to the ultimate materiality 
conundrum. What if an entire industry is, in some sense, unrea-
sonable? This is essentially what scholars have argued about a vast 
part of the mortgage lending industry in the years preceding the 
312 Id. at 778–79. 
313 See id. at 772. 
314 The Eighth Circuit did not actually say this—what the court stated was 
that “[t]he fact that the cashier’s check was obviously fraudulent ... does not mean 
that it was not material, that is, that it did not have a natural tendency to influ-
ence the bank or was not capable of influencing the bank.” Id. at 778–79. It would 
have been more direct for the Rashid court to have stated that the obviously 
fake cashier’s check in the case was material, though the Court of Appeals chose 
not to do so. 
315 Nor does this seem to be a case of exploiting the gullible, as just discussed. 
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Great Recession.316 When few lenders are sleazy or incompetent 
renegades and the vast majority of financial institutions are pru-
dent, the application of an objective materiality standard seems 
sensible and easy to administer. What if, instead, a lack of due 
diligence is endemic? What if innumerable lenders continually 
and regularly act in a foolish, suboptimal or otherwise improper 
manner? The role of materiality as a required element of crimi-
nal fraud is unclear if such behavior becomes the norm. In an 
effort to adhere to an “objective” materiality standard, courts may 
end up holding criminal defendants to a normative materiality stan-
dard based on what should theoretically affect relevant bank 
decision-makers, even though we as a society know that financial 
institutions may be disregarding these principles systematically.317
If the purpose of requiring proof of materiality is connected some-
how to establishing the defendant’s mens rea or fraudulent in-
tent,318 applying a fictional materiality standard unconnected to 
actual bank behavior might be an undesirable outcome. 
CONCLUSION
 The Supreme Court has made it clear that proof of mate-
riality is required for convictions under the federal mail, wire 
and bank fraud statutes.319 During the past twenty years, the 
federal courts have endeavored to apply materiality to federal 
fraud cases involving financial institutions.320 This task is easier 
said than done. Transplanting an elusive common law concept to 
the federal criminal law context has proven quite challenging.321
316 See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME 
VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011); 
Edwards, supra note 9, at 60–68 (discussing the rise of non-prime lending, a 
decline in home loan underwriting standards, and increased securitization of 
mortgage debt prior to the Great Recession). 
317 David Kwok raises a similar point in his discussion of normative and 
descriptive conceptions of materiality in the False Claims Act context. See Kwok, 
supra note 80, at 532 (explaining that “courts may conflate the normative and 
descriptive approaches to causation, as it is unclear whether a juror should 
apply her judgment as to what lies should influence the government as opposed 
to which lies actually influence the government”). 
318 See supra note 82; supra text accompanying note 83. 
319 See supra Section I.C. 
320 See supra Section I.C.2. 
321 See supra Section I.C.2. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar provided the federal ap-
pellate courts with an opportunity to reconsider the role of mate-
riality in criminal fraud cases.322 Thus far, the federal appellate 
courts have rejected the application of Escobar’s “subjective” 
materiality standard to the criminal fraud context.323 Instead, 
the courts of appeals have endorsed an objective materiality 
standard tethered to what a reasonable lender would do—not 
the behavior of renegade lenders.324
 Although limiting Escobar to the False Claims Act context 
may be correct,325 the manner in which courts have interpreted and 
applied Escobar shows deep judicial skepticism towards criminal 
defendants who try to challenge the government’s materiality 
evidence.326 Courts must remember, however, that materiality is 
a required element for the government to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt—immateriality is not an affirmative defense 
that criminal defendants must prove.327 Materiality may not be 
hard to prove—especially in mortgage fraud cases—but it is still 
the government’s burden to do so.328 Furthermore, if an entire 
industry’s decision-making processes become deeply flawed, as it 
did prior to the Great Recession, we must ask what it means for 
false statements to be material and, ultimately, what role mate-
riality plays in our conception of criminal fraud.329
322 See supra Part II. 
323 See supra Part III. 
324 See supra Part IV. 
325 As the Escobar Court explained, “The False Claims Act is not ‘an all-
purpose antifraud statute.’” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016) (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)). This is in stark contrast to the 
mail, wire and bank fraud statutes, which are designed as capacious, broad-
reaching anti-fraud laws. 
326 See supra Part III. 
327 See supra Part IV. 
328 See supra Part V. 
329 See supra Section V.C. 
